

281038

JPRS 81589

20 August 1982

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1294

SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

19981130 113

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

10
70
A04

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

20 August 1982

USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1294

SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

CONTENTS

Table of Contents of Journal 'NARODY AZII I AFRIKI' (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 2, 1982).....	1
English Summaries of Major Articles (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 2, 1982).....	4
Roundtable on Modernization and Third World Mass Consciousness (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 2, 1982).....	6
Advantages of Soviet Aid to Developing States Described (Petr Yakovlevich Koshelev; NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 2, 1982).....	26
Bourgeois Concepts of Third World Development Reviewed (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 2, 1982).....	37
Book on Southeast Asian Islam Reviewed (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 2, 1982).....	45
Table of Contents (LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Jun 82).....	51
Ideological-Political Problems of the Nonalignment Movement Discussed (T. V. Goncharova; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Jun 82).....	53
Book on English-Speaking Caribbean States Reviewed (P. V. Griбанov; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Jun 82).....	65

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF JOURNAL 'NARODY AZII I AFRIKI'

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, 1982 pp 1-2

[Text] Table of Contents	Page
Articles	
P.Ya. Koshelev, "The USSR's Economic Cooperation With African States"	3
G.N. Klimko, A.I. Rogach (both from Kiev), "International Corporations' Joint Ventures in the Developing Countries"	12
V.V. Vladimirov, "The 'Open Doors' Policy in Egypt and the Local Bourgeoisie"	25
N.B. Kochakova, "Evolution of Nigeria's Traditional Political Structures in the Colonial Period"	36
Exchange of Opinions	
Class Formation and Choice of Development Path	
L.A. Fridman, S.V. Boronin, "Hired Labor and the Working Class in the Emergent Countries"	47
From the History of Oriental Studies and Africanistics	
B.V. Lumin (Tashkent), "From the Family Chronicle of Russian Orientalists"	60
The journal's roundtable discussion: Mass Consciousness in the Developing World. Participants: B.S. Yerasov, Yu.A. Zamoshkin, L.R. Polonskaya, V.P. Lukin, V.G. Khoros, N.S. Illarionov (Kishinev), B.S. Starostin, I.A. Mal'-kovskaya, Ye.A. Birgauz, N.R. Guseva, V.B. Klyashtorina, L.Ye. Kubbel' and A.A. Brudnyy. From the editorial board-- A.A. Kutsenkov	
	65
Reports	
M.Yu. Morozova, "The Agrarian Policy of the Military Regime in Pakistan"	82

L.Ye. Cherkasskiy, "'Accusatory' Poetry in Present-Day China"	87
I.Ye. Petrosyan, Yu.A. Petrosyan (both from Leningrad), "From the History of the Turkish 'Free' Press"	95
A.G. Sharbatova, "The Literary Language and Dialects in Arab Fiction and Poetry"	102
T. Khalmurzayev (Tashkent), "Urdu and Hindi in Colonial India"	107

Scientific Life

V.I. Ivanov, A.O. Tamazishvili, "Scientific Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies in the Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress"	116
Yu. N. Vinokurov, "The Soviet-African 'For Peace and Social Progress' Conference"	125
B.M. Svyatskiy, "Youth, Development and Peace (International Conference in Baku)"	130
I.N. Nikishova, "Africanistics in the United States"	133
S.B. Pevzner, "The Bartol'dov Readings. Year Five"	140
News items	147

Criticism and Bibliography

Roundups

Ye.A. Torchunov (Leningrad), "Taoism and Chinese Culture: Problem of Interaction (From Foreign Studies)"	155
--	-----

Reviews

A.V. Gordon, "Social Renewal: Plans and Reality (Critique of Bourgeois Concepts of Modernization of the Developing Countries)" by B.S. Starostin	169
M.T. Stepanyants, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Problem of the Contemporary Ideological Evolution" by A.I. Ionova	173
Ye.V. Ivanova, A.K. Ogloblin (both from Leningrad), "The Peoples of Malaysia and Western Indonesia (Certain Aspects of Spiritual Culture)" by Ye. V. Revunenkov	176
L.A. Lel'kov, "Die Stadt des Yima. Weltbilder in der Architektur" by B. Brentjes	182
S. Kuchera, "Studia Sino-Mongolica. Festschrift fuer Herbert Franke." Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Bauer	184
A.B. Zubov, "Electoral Politics in the Middle East. Issues, Voters and Elites". Ed. by Jacob M. Landau, Ergun Ozbudun, Frank Tachau	189
V.G. Koros, "Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. Underdevelopment and Uncaptured Peasantry" by G. Hyden	194
V.G. Lysenko, "The Philosophy of Classical Yoga" by G.A. Feurerstein	199

Booknotes

V.a. Kremenyuk, "Japan and South Korea ('Development Aid' and Its Consequences" by V.I. Shishayev. V.I. Gusarov, "The Libyan Oil Industry" by Frank C. Waddams. I.L. Fadeyeva, "Mustafa Kemal'in yaninda iki Libya'li lider Ahmet Serif--Suleyman Baruni" by Orhan Kologlu. P.Yu. Tsvetov, "Concise History of Viet (V'yet shy lyok)". Translated from [ven'yanya], introductory article and commentary by A.B. Polyakov. O.P. Deshpande, B.B. Parnikel', "Balinese Traditional Paintings. A Selection From the Forge Collection of the Australian Museum" by A. Forge, Sydney. "Introduction a la litterature balinaise" by S. Hooykaas.	203
Main Works of Prof N.A. Khalfin, Doctor of Historical Sciences (on his 60th Birthday)	212
Main Works of Doctor of Philology N.A. Syromyatnikov (on his 70th Birthday)	214
In remembrance of Grigoriy Natanovich Veyets	216
In remembrance of Sergey Nikolayevich Rostovskiy	216
In remembrance of Mark Solomonovich Rozin	218
Information About the Authors	219
Summary of Main Articles in English	220

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki", Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1982

8850

CSO: 1807/109

ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, 1982 pp 220-221

[Text] Economic Cooperation of the USSR With African States--P.Ya. Koshelev

Strict observance of the partner's rights, respect for national sovereignty, search for mutual advantage are the principles underlying the economic relations of the USSR with developing nations. The article characterises the Soviet economic ties with African states which expanded two-fold over the 70s, deals with cooperation in capital construction, material production, terms of credit and shipment of goods and nature of the economic cooperation at large. The article offers data regarding the Soviet economic assistance in various fields.

The author emphasises that there is every prerequisite for the further expansion of the Soviet-African economic and technical cooperation and prospects for the 80s are most favourable.

Multinational Joint Ventures in Developing Countries--G.N. Klimko, A.I. Rogach

The article presents ample evidence of the growing MNCs resorting to adapting new forms of neo-colonialism in the changing context of developing countries, i.e. using joint ventures with local state and private capital participation. The aims of the partners, however, differ. Whereas MNCs stand for continued neo-colonial exploitation, the developing nations seek economic independence.

The article examines the MNCs activity in capitalist states and those in socialist orientation. In capitalist states MNCs press upon capitalists elements and breed local exploiters in a neo-colonial brand, perpetuating thereby neo-colonial exploitation. In countries of socialist orientation MNCs are treated as a form of capital drawing. Providing a control over capital's movement, joint ventures in this case facilitate the enhancement of the public sector.

The well balanced economic policy vis-a-vis the MNCs allows to diminish the adverse effect of their activity and to utilize their capital to the benefit of national development.

"Open Door" Policy in Egypt and the Local Bourgeoisie--Y.V. Vladimirov

Two principles underlie the Egyptian policy of liberalisation, which has been pursued since the early 70s: granting greater liberty to the private sector and "opening of the doors" to foreign capital. This policy, declared under the slogan of "the sanitation" of the Egyptian economy, implied the abandoning of the non-capitalist path of development, revision of the revolutionary gains of the 1952 July Revolution.

The liberalisation offered no key to the solution of complex socio-economic problems. The donor states of the West and the international financial bodies seek to enhance the dependence of Egypt on the world capitalist system: private investors take the advantage of this policy to make profit by exploiting the Egyptian national resources.

The article highlights the activity of local bourgeoisie. The author characterises the bourgeoisie, brought about by the liberalisation policy, as a parasitic social group. It ignores the national development needs and its sole ambition is to make profit and get rich.

Evolution of Nigeria's Traditional Structures in Colonial Period--N.B. Kochakova

The article deals with the evolution of the major element of the precolonial political structure, i.e. the institution of traditional rulers, under the influence of the colonial rule.

Analysing the impact of the decrees of F. Lugard, the reforms of D. Cameron, the reforms of the indirect rule of the 40s, the constitutional reforms of the 50s and the administrative reforms of the government of the First Republic in the 60s, the author comes to the conclusion that the colonial period saw the institution of traditional rulers undergoing a profound functional and structural transformation. It was dying out as a traditional institution. Its colonial modification, "the chiefs" survived, however. For all practical purposes, the new colonial institution was devised in order to serve as a political agent of the colonial rule.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki", Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury", 1982

CSO: 1807/109

ROUNDTABLE ON MODERNIZATION AND THIRD WORLD MASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, 1982 pp 65-81

[Roundtable discussion: "Mass Consciousness in the Developing World"]

[Text] The inclusion of the broad people's masses of the developing countries in the sociopolitical struggle makes the question of study of their consciousness increasingly urgent. This fact would also very likely explain the widespread use of the term "mass consciousness" in oriental-study and Africanistic sociological literature. A special seminar in the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies was devoted to problems of mass consciousness in the oriental countries. Considering both the comparative novelty of the term itself and a certain methodological incompleteness of questions of the study of mass consciousness and also the abundance of empirical material on individual countries and regions in need of collation and theoretical interpretation, the editorial board of the journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI suggested to a group of Soviet orientalists and Africanists that they exchange opinions on certain key problems of mass consciousness in the Afro-Asian countries. We hope that the questions broached within the framework of the discussion will attract the attention of the scientific community.

I. Content of the Concept and Methodology of Research

B.S. Yerasov (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies). Mass consciousness is an important concept for sociopolitical research. It incorporates not only the political, ideological and cultural aspects of social life but also a certain, if it may be so put, "base" sphere of this life. The Soviet sociologist B.A. Grushin is correct to note that "the essence of this consciousness is by no means the fact that it is more capable than other types of consciousness of influencing people's practical life but that it is a kind of focus in which all existing cross sections of social consciousness come together."*

In its basic content mass consciousness incorporates views and opinions on all questions of social being--from the narrowly wordly through the general philosophical--which take shape historically in the course of the daily, routine practice of the broadest masses, and in this sense this consciousness

*B.A. Grushin, "Mneniye o mira i mir mneniy" [Opinions About the World and World of Opinions], Moscow, 1967, p 61.

essentially coincides with what F. Engels called the *quotidien*, day-to-day consciousness.* Mass consciousness is an inalienable and essentially important part of social consciousness.

In the contemporary mass consciousness characteristic of the developing countries it is possible to distinguish both traditional variants connected with precolonial times and new variants corresponding to the requirements of the classes and groups (proletariat and bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and bureaucracy) which have arisen in the colonial and postcolonial periods. Ethnic, confessional, class, caste and professional elements combine and interact in the mass consciousness. But it is not reduced either to a communal-tribal mythology or "prereligious" consciousness or mass forms of religiosity (connected, for example, with world religions) alone. Mass consciousness incorporates a multilayer seam of tendencies and stereotypes of thinking--extremely archaic and backward, for the most part, but which are always based on a stable tradition which was current in a whole number of previous generations.

A most prevalent principle of mass consciousness is local solidarism incorporating the individual in different variants of the "whole" and the "general" and standardizing his individual consciousness. The individual and the group are prescribed standards of life hallowed by the strength of custom, precepts of the forefathers, "divine will" and so forth. The moral virtues here are confined to the framework of "one's group". They become their opposite when it is a question of those of "others". Solidarist values are inevitably supplemented by antagonism, repulsion from an "alien" group and a negative perception of its customs and standards. Under current conditions such principles engender various kinds of ethnocentrism.

The principles of egalitarianism and hierarchism are also of importance for the traditional mass consciousness. They regulate the sphere of interpersonal relationships. While demanding an equalizing distribution of life's blessings among its "own people" egalitarianism coexists in a complex interweave with principles of hierarchism which are clearly fixed in the consciousness.** Rank, caste and class divisions are shaped by outward signs and standards of behavior. They become for the consciousness also the criterion and basis of individuals' intrinsic value and self-importance. Such a system cultivates not only obedience but also an admiration of those above and a tendency toward domination in respect of those below. The traditional mass consciousness is oriented primarily toward satisfaction of immediate vital requirements. But these requirements are strictly determined by the position of a given group or individual in the overall structure of relationships.

An important aspect of the traditional mass consciousness is the attitude toward authority. The latter is represented in family-clan and paternalistic symbols of patronage. "Just" authority is called on to ensure the customary

*K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], vol 20, p 14.

**See "The Class Struggle and Concepts of Egalitarianism in the Developing Countries," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 6, 1978.

measure of solidarism and egalitarianism, preventing a total rupture of paternalistic relations. Observing these conditions, the purveyor of authority is endowed by the mass consciousness with exceptional capabilities and special powers.

There continues to be a considerable difference in the developing countries between the consciousness of the broad masses and the consciousness of narrower circles of the population which are contemporarily oriented and are aware of their social role. Upon investigation of this difference we see for ourselves that mass consciousness is not only a target for influence from above but also an active source substantially forming (or deforming) the ideological atmosphere and political life.

The gap between the mass and modern ideological consciousness engenders problems which are difficult to solve and acute collisions and dramas. At various stages of the history of the Asian and African countries the intelligentsia has repeatedly been sorrowfully aware of the failure of its "approach to the people". The ideas not only of cultural liberalism but also of revolutionary democratism have experienced a difficult fate since these currents have proven capable of drawing into their orbit only limited social strata, leaving the mass basis untouched.

The present-day conflicts between the ideological and mass consciousness are also acute. Abatements and backward movements in the sociopolitical life of the young independent states; unexpected transformations of ideological teachings in the process of their assimilation by the mass strata; the costs and ruinous consequences of accelerated cultural "modernization"; the ineffectiveness of transformations reduced merely to the economic and social spheres --all these testify to the high significance of the consciousness of the masses as a factor shaping social life and largely determining the dynamics and prospects of its development.

Yu.A. Zamoshkin (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the United States and Canada). The theoretical significance of the "mass consciousness" category is not in question. We employ this category--and quite extensively--in a study of the actually prevailing, most stable types of consciousness which have a real impact on the behavior of large masses of people.

In our literature the adjective "mass," when applied to consciousness, frequently presupposes a certain value sign--positive (inasmuch as it indicates the connection of this consciousness with the masses) or negative (if we refer to the concept of the "mass society" or the influence on the consciousness of concrete forms of "mass propaganda" which we evaluate negatively). Yet "mass consciousness" is primarily not a value but analytical category. It is necessary for a serious scientific analysis of social consciousness. It affords a possibility of recording the processes occurring not within the framework of some specific class or stratum and not only at the professional-ideological level or at the level of groups engaged in brainwork (ideologists and "intellectuals" also to some extent come within the framework of mass consciousness inasmuch as they are members of their society) but within a broader framework. Mass consciousness reflects not only the characteristics

defined by the class and social structure and conditions of social being which exist at a given historical moment. It contains the result of many centuries of history and the result of contradictory historical destiny, in which these communities or the other have emerged and fragmented, united and dissolved and become a part of this state-political formation or the other. An analysis of these processes will afford us an opportunity of comprehending how the contradictions and changes in the fate of many generations have been reflected in the mass consciousness and what influence has been exerted by national catastrophes, wars, invasions and periods of the dependent and colonial existence of this people or the other.

The attributes of the mass consciousness are an important problem. It is necessary here, it would appear to us, to study the nature of man's recognition of himself as an individual and the degree and singularities of his separation himself from the community. It is a question of the correlation in the consciousness of individual and collective principles and the type of self-awareness of the personality. Under Asian or African conditions, where for millennia the individual has perceived his impotence, the actual possibilities for and the pace of the establishment of stable democratic principles in political life undoubtedly frequently prove to be considerably limited. An orientation toward the spiritual subordination or attachment of the "little man" to the "big man" is characteristic here, which also leads to a strengthening of the role of charisma in politics, the deification of leaders and other phenomena of the same ilk, which give rise to autocratic tendencies and reliance on religion or quasireligious ideology. These tendencies coexist, furthermore, within the framework of mass movements which actively draw into their orbit tens and hundreds of millions of people, and the spontaneous, direct moods of the masses are manifested in their own particular way in these movements.

L.R. Polonskaya (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies). First concerning the very concept "mass consciousness": in terms of certain parameters--like the outlook and standard of behavior of the broadest strata of the population with respect to all questions of social being--it is really identical to everyday consciousness. However, at the same time the use of these two terms is distinguished by certain specifics.

The term "mass consciousness" should be employed, we believe, to define the notions which relate predominantly to the sphere of socioeconomic and political relationships and the standards of morality and ethics connected with them. For this reason it would appear to us that to apply the definition "political" to mass consciousness is superfluous inasmuch as all mass consciousness has been politicized to some extent or other. It should at the same time be emphasized that "mass consciousness," as distinct from ideology, is not a social and not a class concept. It embraces the consciousness of the broadest strata of the population, synthesizing both stable spiritual values, including traditional, clan, tribal, communal and ethnic notions, cultivated over centuries and elements of national consciousness on the one hand and class consciousness on the other. Consequently, it reflects the spiritual ideals not only of the nonproletarian toiling and petty-proprietorial strata of the population connected with traditional production modes but also of the

proletariat and thus incorporates spiritual channels for the spread of the ideology of scientific socialism in the masses. Nor is it devoid either of the spiritual influence of exploiter strata and elitist groups which have traditional ties to certain groups of the population or the influence of bourgeois ideology.

Consequently, traditional consciousness is only a component of mass consciousness, the notions which have arisen on the basis of the formation of new social and class relations constituting its other part.

In the emergent Asian and African countries the dialectical contradiction between the old and the new and the traditional and the modern largely determines the main trends of the development of the mass consciousness. Both these components influence one another here. For this reason the traditional seam of the modern mass consciousness differs from the consciousness of the pre-colonial and colonial periods. At the same time the emergent countries' present-day modernized consciousness differs from the mass consciousness of the developed countries.

In the mass consciousness the new phenomena of social life are "digested" most easily with the help of an appeal to stable customary symbols. The new strivings in the mass consciousness take advantage of traditional language and employ traditional forms. The masses frequently reject the modernized type of behavior and ideology in essence while abiding by the content which these modernized standards and ideas have established. This might also explain to a large extent the processes of the Islamization of policy in countries with a Muslim majority of the population in the 1970's-1980's. We must be very cautious in our use of the terms "neotraditionalism" and "neoreformism" to characterize mass consciousness as a whole since this could create the impression of the possibility of the reverse movement of "mass consciousness" under modern conditions.

"Mass consciousness" is extremely heterogeneous. It is possible to speak of the "mass consciousness" of a tribe, commune and different ethnic groups residing on the territory of a single state. Thought should be given to the use of the term "mass consciousness" to characterize the ideological standpoints of various contemporary professional groups of the population. At the same time we may speak of a study of the "mass consciousness" of the broadest strata of the population of a country as a whole. Certain of its common features are characteristic of the most diverse groups of the population, and it is this that distinguishes "mass consciousness" from "elite consciousness."

II. Development Trends and Contradictions

Yu.A. Zamoshkin. Obviously, the nonequivalence and contradictoriness of the reorganization of former social structures and forms of vital activity engender profoundly heterogeneous trends in former and new forms of consciousness. As in social relationships, so in spiritual-psychological life also growth phenomena curiously interweave with stagnation and decay trends and various forms of the "symbiosis" of new and old. The changes embrace all aspects of spiritual-psychological processes: their value content, the mechanism of their introduction, the nature of the interaction of everyday and ideological consciousness and the scale and thrust of value orientations.

Everywhere living conditions are changing dynamically and contradicting stable habits, expectations, thinking and feeling structures, tendencies and views. And this clash of the old and the new, the customary structures of consciousness and new conditions of social being and expectations and reality is proceeding in a nonequivalent manner and sometimes extremely dramatically. We may have here a "revival," that is, a resuscitation of this customary structure of consciousness or the other which has clashed with the new forms of social being. When the objective conditions for the realization of customary tendencies disappear, these tendencies sometimes acquire in the consciousness a new value. There could also be here adaptation of the consciousness to changing social being accompanied by the superseding, "sublimation" and transference of this element of consciousness or the other; the old could appear in a new form and be curiously combined with the new, and a situation could arise wherein the old values die out, but new ones have yet to emerge and when old values simply become "antivalues," while positive values are virtually absent. Here we encounter huge swings and fluctuations and a colossal variety of mass neuroses and forms of "unhappy" consciousness. These processes are very complex and cannot be termed simply the "collapse" of the traditional consciousness. They are collapse, renewal, preservation and temporary strengthening even. Effecting a typology of these processes and their linkage with social factors and the diversity and specifics of class, cultures and peoples--this is a field for concrete research.

B.S. Yerasov. The sphere of social consciousness in the developing countries is at the present time being subjected to an increasingly great extent to the influence of production, industrial, professional, scientific-technical and political factors. But the changes are encompassing the consciousness not only of the relatively modernized strata but also the masses which have not yet been enlisted in stable forms of contemporary labor and relationships. A decisive influence on the nature of the changes in the mass consciousness is exerted by the sociopolitical orientation adopted in a given society and the political structure and ideology which have been established. In countries of a capitalist development path the crisis of the former forms of society's organization threatens the disintegration of both social relationships and world-outlook tendencies. This crisis is being experienced extremely intensively in the consciousness, leading to dramatic "discharges" of tremendous masses of energy culminating in pent-up feelings of disillusionment, despair and hatred. Such upheavals are leading to an intensive search for stable life orientations capable of securing for the hapless masses dependable prospects in life. A complex interweaving of traditions and contemporaneity is emerging and both the breakup of former values and their stimulation are occurring in the course of this search.

Here, we believe, we have such variants of a change in the mass consciousness as a stimulation of the traditional forms of consciousness and their spread to new spheres of social life; a gradual partial "modernization" of the former consciousness being introduced to modern types of professional and political activity; and the erosion and decomposition of traditional forms of consciousness under the influence of capitalist modernization and the reaction to this decomposition, assuming both a restoration and left-radical nature. These trends are highly heterogeneous and do not amount to a restoration movement

"back," from contemporary values to values of the past. Undoubtedly, a considerable proportion of the population in many Asian and African countries is still mired in traditional subsistence-patriarchal relationships and takes virtually no part in social life. On the other hand, entirely modern strata capable of assimilating modern social and political orientations are also growing. Nonetheless, it is precisely the "neotraditionalist" movements connected, as a rule, with mass religious systems (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism) which have recently become increasingly influential in a number of Asian and African countries.

What is the mechanism leading to the growth of "neotraditionalist" orientations?

The new forms of social being are having a demoralizing impact on traditional standards and undermining the evolved structure of consumption and the hierarchy of life's values. In the traditional consciousness the former restrictions are being removed, and the new possibilities are being perceived as an incentive to increase direct consumption. Disruption of the former hierarchical (caste, status, role) levels of consumption is leading to an intensive race for life's benefits. However, their actual distribution is subordinated very strictly to the new class principles, which condemn the broad masses torn from the former forms of existence to vegetation.

The negative reaction of broad strata of the population increases and the inertia of former vital principles and customary forms of world outlook is reflected under these conditions. However, it by no means amounts to a literal turn "backward," to the restoration of former exclusive forms of existence and everyday forms of consciousness. A serious reorganization of traditional tendencies is under way: the broad masses are becoming a part of social movements and adopting radical political programs, endeavoring to change the intolerable conditions of existence.

Such situations were once analyzed in depth by V.I. Lenin, who pointed out that in the course of long oppression and ruin the Russian peasantry in reform Russia "had built up a mass of hatred, anger and desperate resolve"* and a readiness for mass radical protest. At the same time V.I. Lenin pointed to the incapacity of the mass consciousness for comprehending the essence of the new relationships which were taking shape and this consciousness' susceptibility to utopian and illusory ideas.

Religious "revivalism" departs from a rational comprehension of reality and a consideration of objective patterns. Its ideological programs are based more often than not on subjective factors and rely on excited belief, emotional symbols and verbal magic. The stormy reaction against unacceptable reality sometimes leads to this reality acquiring a largely distorted reflection. The programs which are proclaimed are impracticable, as a rule, and imbued with utopianism and fruitless illusions. The backward movement could be accompanied by a real slump in the society's development, a renunciation of the level attained earlier and a restoration of elements of the past.

*V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 17, p 210.

V.P. Lukin (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the United States and Canada). The waves of mass movements in the young independent states (the latest rolled over countries of the Middle East on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's) have revealed with new force the tenacity of tradition in the new, transformed variants of social consciousness.

The connection between the changes in social reality and the shifts in the mass consciousness is complex. Traditional mass consciousness often decomposes only to be replaced by ideas which are different in specific symbolic nomenclature but just as certainly confined to "local solidarism," the "egalitarianism-hierarchism" dichotomy and other attributes of the traditional mass mentality. Tradition assumes a new appearance, but the new cults and new institutions quite quickly begin to be illumined by the familiar traditional luminescence, although their "outer casing" appears modernist and is outwardly connected with the most progressive social concepts and trends.

A change in the traditional forms of consciousness (in the sense of a reworking of the "traditionalist code") is an extraordinarily long process. It is perhaps far more prolonged than the phenomena which can be traced in the life of one-two generations. Elements of the traditional mass consciousness are so tenacious and plastic that they can be detected even in the most developed capitalist societies (it is sufficient to mention the structure of the Mafioso consciousness, various utopian sects and periodic outbursts of local tist patriotism).

Elements of both traditional and contemporary consciousness coexist and in various circumstances are manifested in the young independent states. Iran has become the latest indicative example in this respect. Mechanisms extremely reminiscent of the forms of mass consciousness of present-day capitalist society operated at the "normal" tranquil state of social evolution. But an explosion occurred, and passions, emotions, reactions and reasons testifying to the presence in those same people of a different level of mass psychology which had been in the shadows, as it were, in the depths and which was, nonetheless, powerful, integral and by no means decomposed burst through to the surface with tremendous force and pressure. After a time this level could "subside" again and retreat to the shadows. But will it be decomposed? Hardly.

What is the criterion of the progressiveness of this mass ideology or the other in the developing countries? It evidently cannot be found within the ideology itself. The criterion should be sought in the extent to which under the specific conditions of its time this ideology contributes to the emancipation of the creative, constructive forces of society. A paradox is possible here. Traditionalist terminology (frequently necessary to ensure the mass intelligibility of the ideology) could conceal an orientation toward the decomposition of the "traditionalist code". And, the contrary, "modernist" phraseology conceals an orientation toward the assertion and reproduction of traditionalism.

A study of the international-policy aspects of traditional mass consciousness would appear extremely important at the present time. The instincts and prejudices dictated by this form of mass consciousness are exerting a tremendous influence on the content and dynamics of world politics. Under conditions where complex multilateral collective actions aimed at the solution of man's most urgent global problems are becoming increasingly categorical imperatives, the vestiges of traditionalist consciousness are pulling their purveyors in the direction of customary, simple and rapid local solutions which after a certain length of time prove illusory and only intensify the complexity of the situation. Such subconscious motives as an endeavor to fence off one's own problems (and their solution also) from those of "others," a belief that military strength automatically carries over into political influence and that expansion of the spheres of influence and control ensure the security of one's country or one's tribe are preserved. These notions lead to constant conflicts and crises and in the current situation contribute to such phenomena as an uncontrolled arms race, including the most dangerous proliferation around the world of nuclear weapons.

V.G. Khoros (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies). The mass consciousness of the Afro-Asian countries contains a strong anticapitalist charge. At the stage of late, waning and "peripheral" capitalism characteristic of a number of oriental countries (and brought about by the expansion of colonialism and imperialism) the intrusion of bourgeois relationships in traditional structures has led to a sharp stratification of society, disproportions between city and countryside, the pauperization of broad strata of the population and their growing cultural-psychological disorientation. Whence the natural protest of the petty producer against "another's" capitalism--a protest which has provided a social base for many revolutionary movements and national-democratic regimes in the emergent states. But this process often contains more than just progressive anti-imperialist aspirations. The "noncapitalism" of the mass consciousness sometimes contains elements of primitive equalization, anticultural tendencies and much else, and, furthermore, separating the wheat from the chaff here is extraordinarily difficult.

The conditions of the developing societies vest considerable responsibility in the political leaders, including and particularly the national democrats. An ideological program and development strategy capable of more or less organically synthesizing innovations with the progressive elements of the national sociocultural heritage and actively incorporating ideological-cultural traditions in the development process are, I believe, the most effective from the viewpoint of mobilization of the mass consciousness and the simultaneous softening of its negative effects. The mass consciousness will thereby be able to perform to a greater extent its positive integrating-stabilizing role in the social progress of the young states.

N.S. Illiaronov (Kishinev University). Changes in the value structure of the mass consciousness in oriental countries occur ultimately under the influence of the reorganization of base relationships, but this dependence is mediated by a multitude of superstructural factors. In particular, it would be an oversimplification to speak of the automatic "modernization" of the mass consciousness in the wake of innovations of a technical-economic nature and the

appearance of nontraditional elements in sociopolitical relationships and mass culture. The reaction of the mass consciousness to modernization processes is complex and varied and sometimes assumes an outwardly paradoxical nature even. Among such phenomena in the mass consciousness we can put the archaization of its political-ideological component, that is, increased traditionalistically colored tendencies with respect to the institutions of public authority. The following could be signs of this archaization: denial of the functionality of the new political elite for the life of traditional society; increased political particularism or "nationalism" of a narrowly regional scale; increased prestige of the traditional political elite; and the increased role of customs as a counterweight to the state's regulating activity. At the same time it needs to be considered that this archaization as a whole is a byproduct of modernization processes and may hardly be reduced to regressive currents. It reflects the contradictions of the process of modernization in a society still firmly tied to traditional factors. Therefore such archaization is only a step in the process of the disintegration of traditional forms of consciousness and their replacement by new forms.

B.S. Starostin (Moscow). Not only changes in the content and orientations of this consciousness and behavior but also the reorganization of the inner mechanism of the mass consciousness itself are important factors of the reorganization of former variants of the personality's consciousness and behavior. A considerable syncretism characterizes the individual and social consciousness in the traditional variants. The unbroken nature of the religious and secular, moral, legal and other forms--all this imbues various systems of socialization equally, despite all the ethnic or sociocultural differences. Socialization, with the help of its conservative elements, on the one hand serves as a mechanism of the maintenance and reproduction of traditionalist forms of mass consciousness. On the other, modern mechanisms of socialization (secular preschool and school establishments, the mass information media and new forms of participation in economic and political life) are eroding the traditionalism of the social consciousness, augmenting and strengthening in it elements and values of a more open, dynamic, nonethnic, rational and scientific nature. This process in different countries also has a number of common features. Socialization in the traditional society has a clearly programmed internal content--an inadequately separated and little-changing strict list of the skills and values which should be assimilated by the individual. The undeveloped economic activity and sociocultural homeostatic nature of such a society (with low life expectancy) have brought about the simplicity and artificially accelerated nature of socialization. There is a single set of prescriptions here covering behavior, thoughts and feelings as a result of which people become accustomed to certain diets, dress and ceremonies, share the same views and bring up their children in the expectation that they will behave like their parents.

Such singularities of the socialization of the individual are even now characteristic of more than just the most archaic social formations of postcolonial society. They are part of a more extensive mechanism of the reproduction of traditionalism and traditional forms of social consciousness.

Many foreign scholars, including those of the developing countries themselves, note the instability and eclecticism in the structure of the personality under the conditions of a transitional society--the predominance of a "psychological split" type of personality called in sociological literature "marginal". Tradition and contemporaneity, mysticism and rationalism, knowledge and archaic prejudices and religious meditation and political dynamism strangely get along together in this type. J. Nehru's assessment of his personality in his "Autobiography" is widely known: "I have become a curious mixture of East and West, a stranger everywhere and a home nowhere."

The process of the break with "traditionalism" and modernization lead to the disintegration of the former sociocultural uniformity and increased value variability. This variability is a condition of the mobility of the social system and its progressive development; it contributes to the creation of the prerequisites for the individualization of the personality. Strict regulation of the individual's behavior "for all of life's contingencies" can no longer be prescribed under the new conditions; only general socially acceptable (within the framework of a given community or class) standards where the individual has a certain freedom of choice and a set of models of permissible behavior for some concrete situation or other are prescribed.

Decolonization and the current stage of the postcolonial society's social development are proceeding under the conditions of the existence of the world socialist community, which demonstrates by its practice not only the creation of new social relationships but also the successful formation of the personality of the new historical type. The increasingly extensive spread of the ideas of scientific socialism in the emergent countries and the option by a number of them for a socialist orientation of development are creating the actual prerequisites for the pursuit of a rational policy aimed at fundamental socio-economic transformations, the gradual establishment of collectivist and humanistic relationships and the formation of the personality of the new type.

I.A. Mal'kovskaya (University of Friendship of the Peoples imeni B. Lumumba). The combination of different social and cultural structures and the presence of different development trends within the framework of large and small communities are leading to a complex interweaving of psychological and mental tendencies and orientations. As "personal" and "real," "western" and "eastern" and "traditional" and "modern" religious and secular principles combine and clash in social relationships, so contradictory and antinomian trends even arise in the structure of the consciousness and behavior of the personality.

Profound changes in social reality in the emergent countries are switching the individual in to a world of relationships and forms of activity which are new to him, thereby making new demands on his inner tendencies. But strong seams of old habits, evaluations and notions supported by the traditional lifestyle live on in him. Nonetheless, together with these great significance is also assumed by new factors of the formation of the personality--modern education, political views and principles, professional training, knowledgeability and so forth.

The former values of egalitarianism and hierarchism and solidarist and paternalist standards do not withstand the pressure of new status and class stratifications. This incompatibility sometimes ends for the individual himself in the destruction of the personality, mental traumas and breakdowns and a "dual" consciousness. The vast amount of socio-psychological literature on the Asian and African countries testifies to the highly prevalent nature of such phenomena. Of course, in the sociological plane they are typical more of the urban than rural strata, primarily the socially unsettled groups of the urban semi- and Lumpenproletariat. But such psychological factors are present to this extent or the other as a permanent "background" or possibility, threatening to manifest themselves in periods of social conflicts and upheavals.

In the mental structure of the personality the former values and orientations may interweave with the new, subordinating them to themselves for the time being. Traditional tendencies "grow" in contemporary reality, engendering an odd combination of magic and science and political and clan interests. The psychological mechanisms of solidarism are switched in to new symbols which are meaningful on a far larger scale. The new national, political and cultural orientations imbibe the former psychological tendencies, not breaking them up but transforming them into a new quality. Contemporary nationalist and religious currents frequently appear as variants of transformed old forms of social interconnection based on the customary stereotypes and emotional tendencies of everyday consciousness. Political orientations appear as a new aspect of the former tendencies of the consciousness. But performing a similar role, the religious connections are fixed not in an eschatological future but in the actual movement of coreligionists. Nonetheless, mass active-ness contains a charge opposite to traditionalism. Despite their traditionalist cover, the shifts in the mass consciousness are shaking the old standards of life enshrined in laws, customs, way of thinking and style of behavior.

III. Mass Consciousness and Problems of Ideology, Religion and Culture

B.S. Yerasov. The problem of the correlation of mass consciousness and ideology in the developing countries is extremely urgent. Ideologists of various fields in these countries are searching for means and forms which might make their ideological constructions intelligible to the masses. In their appeal to the masses the ideological systems in the developing countries frequently adopt an oversimplified form. An analysis of actual problems is sometimes replaced by a set of propaganda stereotypes of a clearly expressed emotional coloration aimed at having a mass mobilizing impact. Ideology serves as a "bridge" from former stereotypes of consciousness to modern forms of thinking, it strengthens elements of rationalization in the consciousness gradually, from level to level, and contributes to the development of alternatives which initially take possession of the consciousness and are subsequently converted into practical activity.

Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that not only a one-sided impact "from the top down" occurs here. Adapting to the mass perception, ideology itself frequently changes its content and could prove captive to the same slogans which it is cultivating at the "practical-utilitarian" level. Mass consciousness

exerts strong pressure "from below" on the ideologists, and it may be resisted only on a very high level of maturity and institutional officialization. These trends can be traced upon an analysis of different variants of nationalist ideology, which frequently have things in common with reformed religious currents. But for nationalism the ethnic-group-forming indication is becoming the determining factor, while confessional factors act only as one of the elements of the "cultural heritage".

The singularities of mass consciousness need to be studied in their correlation with various forms of political-ideological struggle. It is important to know why and how progressive and conservative, national and international forces appeal to the mass consciousness.

Ye.A. Birgauz (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations). The approach to an analysis of ideology in the developing countries from the viewpoint of its effectiveness makes it possible to ascertain the most "operational" value indications and characteristics of the traditional mass consciousness under current conditions. Among these characteristics, essential significance is attached to "neotraditionalism". It is precisely the declared and persistently publicized traditionalism of official ideology which, it is presumed, is designed to contribute to its effectiveness.

Upon encountering the modern form of social being the traditional consciousness stresses not the production but the consumerist, appropriational aspect. Thus "attainability values" are formed in the social consciousness which are used by official ideology to increase its power of persuasion. But at the same time ideology becomes a field in which utopian, "miracle-working" development programs are cultivated whose fulfillment requires the indispensable mobilization of the masses. This system also incorporates egalitarianism, which is also oriented not toward production but redistribution. On the ideological level it nurtures in the context of the current international situation such global doctrines as the theory of "rich and poor countries" and "resource nationalism". These concepts, which view the world as being divided in accordance with the principle of community of interests in the struggle for survival, are also connected with certain tendencies of mass consciousness.

Based on the initial dualistic pairs of mass psychology and self-awareness--"them and us"--neotraditionalism puts forward originality slogans and endeavors to sharpen the image of the "external enemy," frequently abstractly defined, and in the "struggle" against him and as a counterweight to him appeals for class peace and national unity within the country.

An important part in transitional societies is played by the psychological need of the formerly oppressed peoples for the rehabilitation of their property and cultural-historical heritage and compensation for the previous underestimation and humiliation. Proceeding from these sentiments and appealing to them, many ideologists of the developing countries are persistently developing cultural-messianic motifs. The historical role of this charismatic leader or the other who embodies--according to official doctrine--the spiritual values of the nation (and together with him the entire ruling group) is inflated to a regional, third-world and planetary scale.

N.R. Guseva (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography). The sphere of mass consciousness in India is characterized by such a form of self-awareness as caste self-awareness, which has evolved over many centuries, has been supported by the social structure of society and has been based on the provisions of customary law codified by the religion of Hinduism (which subsequently became a part of Jainism also, have been preserved to a certain extent in Sikhism and have been partially assimilated by Indian Islam and Christianity even).

In the period of the conception of capitalist relationships in India, which brought about the growth of the national liberation struggle, there was a sharpening of ethnic self-awareness also. As is known, the demand for the creation of linguistic provinces was at that time on the agenda of sessions, conferences and meetings of the country's leading parties and organizations. In parallel with this there was also increased recognition of the national-political unity of the whole of Indian society, which, following liberation, assumed the form of all-state self-awareness ("we Indians"). But even in the most recent period of history the struggle for ethno-linguistic self-determination and for the creation and specification of states' boundaries as ethnic territories has not ceased, and this struggle has assumed and sometimes continues to assume a character (the Indian press calls this nationalism or provincialism) which indicates a confrontation between two forms of self-awareness--ethnic and all-state.

At the same time India's example shows that religious self-awareness is an extraordinarily excitable sphere which easily relegates ethnic, class and other forms of self-awareness to a secondary position. Caste self-awareness is also a powerful mental factor largely determining the Indian's way of thought and behavior. Bloody clashes provoked by the conflict situation in the sphere of the class interests of members of different castes have flared up repeatedly between the upper and lower castes within the confines of a single ethnic group.

In the environment of the rural population the bourgeois social nature of the members of the "clean" castes (both upper and middle), who are landowners, usurers and merchants, is manifested increasingly clearly as capitalist relationships develop and the marketability of all agriculture as a whole increases. They are stopping at nothing to preserve their right to social and material advantages and the exploitation of the members of the lower castes traditionally subordinated to and dependent on them, chiefly agricultural workers, one-third of whom are Harijans (Untouchables). The class-caste conflicts reveal the extreme exacerbation of caste self-awareness. Caste consciousness frequently supersedes ethnic consciousness: according to the newspaper NEW AGE, in the 15 months of 1977-1978 over 1,000 Harijans ethnically related to the same groups as the members of higher castes persecuting and suppressing them were brutally murdered in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar alone.

V.B. Klyashtorina (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies). There has been an unusual increase in the role of culture in the developing countries at the current stage. Cultural factors are increasingly manifestly

performing the function of regulator and indicator of social changes and shifts, acquiring political weight thereby. The propositions concerning social fetishism in the traditional structures, when certain principles and relationships acquire particular significance for the traditional consciousness, are largely corroborated by the processes of mass consciousness currently observed in Iran.

As is known, revolutionary events in the country proper began with "culturological" acts--the burning of night clubs and restaurants and the smashing of casinos and other facilities of the entertainment industry. The first decrees of the victorious Islamic revolution in March 1979 banned the showing of Western films and entertainment programs on radio and television, closed and razed enterprises producing hard liquor and selling it and banned the wearing of "excessively revealing" European female apparel.

All these acts were the result of the reaction of the traditional mass consciousness to the new phenomena in the national culture of Iran in the 1970's. The rapid bourgeoisification of the cultural sphere which had taken place under the pressure of the West's entertainment industry led by the mid-1970's to the emergence and flourishing of a domestic variety of "mass culture" and subsequently to a wave of protest against it and the crisis of social consciousness in the cultural sphere. Angry letters to newspapers and journals apropos various television and movie theater programs and radio broadcasts (particularly those for children and young people) preaching money-grubbing, aspirituality and consumerist interests and warnings on the part of writers, artists and professors concerning the fate of national theater, cinema and literature were intensified by a wave of protests in religious circles. The crisis of consciousness was undoubtedly a form of manifestation of anti-imperialist sentiments in society, but it was significant that it blended into purely "culturological" forms, to which national cultural traditions and factors of mass social psychology contributed. The discrepancy between the ethical and aesthetic standards of prevalent varieties of the mass bourgeois culture of the West and the traditional ethical and aesthetic standards of the Iranian social consciousness at all levels was reflected. Artistic poetical tradition was always very high in Iran and shaped mass consciousness on the models of aesthetic values which had evolved over millennia. Exalted spirituality, ethical fervor and the intensity of shared sufferings are also characteristic of the aesthetic level of the religious Shi'ite consciousness, which is reflected in mysteries on the theme of the sufferings and death of the Shi'ite saints Ali and Husayn. The role of contemporary fiction and poetry in the interpretation of current happenings and the formation of the social consciousness is great and impressive. For this reason the prose and poetry of contemporary Iran and the ideas and characters of the leading literary masters, Gholam Hossein, Sayedi, Ferridun Tankaboni and Nader Naderpur, were in the last decade a compass and tuning fork of the social consciousness. This is why the spiritual reference points of the personality proposed by mass culture--the appeal to sex and violence and the cult of material success and consumer values in the context of the general structural crisis of the country and anti-imperialist struggle--were rejected by broad strata of Iranian society. Extreme indications of mass consciousness were sometimes manifested in this rejection.

In contrast to the practice of the ousted monarchical regime with its cultural doctrine decreed from above, which was designed to stimulate the nation's unity on the basis of historical monarchical traditions and the cult of pre-Islamic antiquity, the trend of the formation of ideology from below based on the stereotypes of mass consciousness, primarily the consciousness of the peasantry and urban lower strata with the egalitarianism, distrust of the former authorities, hostility toward the city and its culture and acute xenophobia characteristic of them, was established.

Naturally, this consciousness was easily clothed in a religious cover. Only the Muslim cultural heritage is now recognized in Iran. Pre-Islamic Iran and non-Islamic secular culture are disregarded. The appeal of Islamic traditions in the system of mass communications is intended, in the thinking of Shi'ite ideologists, to contribute to a sharpening of the revolutionary situation and rally the nation in the struggle against the external enemy. Whence also the appeal to revolutionary enthusiasm--readiness for deprivations, self-sacrifice, readiness to die for the "true way" (the Shahadah) and orientation toward "satisfaction with a little". The cultural and cultural heritage concepts customary for the mass consciousness of past years are being torn up for this purpose, and in their place concepts of the unity of Muslim ideology and ideas of the unification of all Muslims of the region in a single community opposed to everything "non-Islamic" and relying solely on true ethical and political traditions are being introduced.

L.Ye. Kubbel' (USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies). Political consciousness in the traditional society is always a totality of myth, ritual, religion and political experience proper. For this reason the symbols of mass political consciousness in these societies are also of far broader significance than in, say, the developed capitalist society. In addition, political time in this consciousness is cyclical and does not have a linear dimension but moves in a closed circle.

The contemporary mass political consciousness in the young African states is characterized by the interaction of two elements, two political cultures, which are entirely different by stage. First, the traditional political culture. Second, the political culture introduced by a colonial administration and imposed subsequently. The masses' introduction to the new forms of political culture begins in the course of the struggle for independence and after independence, within the framework of the new state structures. But this introduction is a lengthy and contradictory process in the course of which an incomplete political biculturalism emerges. At its present stage what is assimilated of the new is very often merely the form: there is a certain extension of the symbols of political culture while the traditional value orientations are preserved. In other words, a thin veneer of modern notions concerning the "rules of the game" is imposed from above, but beneath it remains the strong and unbroken seam of the same traditional values and activity motives.

This division leads on the one hand to the instability of political behavior and, on the other, to the deformation of the new political forms by traditional orientations. This is manifested increasingly clearly in the adaptation of

more or less modern types of political organization for the needs of movements which are purely tribalistic in essence. Such, for example, are political parties on an ethnic basis. Another example. There is much discussion in our country as to why the one-party state with the (let us call it "para-charismatic") figure of a leader at the head is so prevalent under African conditions. This phenomenon is inseparably connected with the traditional forms of political culture--its unbroken nature and the "small man's" propensity for passing on to the "big man" all his potentialities, ascribing to the "leader" the capacity for combating little-understood and frequently hostile external circumstances. The experience of those countries like Togo and Benin, where time after time a Western-model parliamentary regime installed there has collapsed and its place been taken by a traditional model with a leader at the head, civilian or military, is interesting from this viewpoint.

Under African conditions the strength of tradition is such that even modern means of mass communication may prove to be not at all what they represent in an industrially developed society. In fact the transistor radio in the African "interior" has long been virtually a newspaper cliché. Yet used for political propaganda, it continues and maintains the characteristic singularity of the transmission of social information in the traditional society--its oral nature.

A.A. Brudnyy (Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law). There is also such a specific aspect of the mass consciousness of the people of the foreign East as the attitude toward texts; a certain comprehension of written texts and the formation on the basis thereof of mass notions concerning the possible and the actual. The written text occupies in the foreign East a particularly high (compared with the so-called "Central European standard") rung on the scale of values determining socially meaningful behavior. Literacy has been regarded as of old as the distinguishing characteristic of persons involved in administration, and the texts were seen (and are seen) as something controlling people's behavior. This applies to the broadest sum total of texts--claims concerning the influence of epic poetry on the motifs of social planning in India or the fact that the choice of the region of partisan operations in China in the 1920's was made under the influence of the classical novel "River Backwaters" may be encountered.

Constantly present in the social consciousness is the notion that an understanding of texts has an esoteric basis and that there may always be a tight circle of those to whom the "true meaning" of a given concrete text is intelligible. The masses are inclined to look trustingly on "authoritative interpretations," imparting to them virtually greater significance than the very content of the texts. This feature of the mass consciousness is of considerable significance for the organization of propaganda acts.

- ✓ The boundary between the possible and the actual (unstable in the social sphere in general) in the mass consciousness of the peoples of certain oriental countries succumbs to the pressure of communicative influence with obvious facility. Texts containing extremely improbable flights of imagination are frequently perceived as a guide to the interpretation of facts. Possible connections between facts here are unreservedly taken to be real; the

assertions made in texts, relayed by the mass information media, are regarded as the sole possible ones. There is a predominant trend toward perceiving communicable facts as arguments in support of certain ideas. Such ideas are drawn with sharp, easily perceived, semantic strokes and are retained in the memory in invariable form. Special significance is attached to the intentions (good or odious) ascribed to specific persons. The realization of these intentions is evaluated by no means according to the scale of results achieved.

A comparatively stable trust in authoritative interpretations of texts in the East is paradoxically combined with individual variations in respect of social and natural reality. We may draw the conclusion (hypothetical to a certain extent) that mass consciousness in the East is a phenomenon of intra-group interaction which has extraordinary strength in the process of regulated collective activity and which disappears in the sphere of individual consciousness and self-awareness abstracted from the circulation of information within the group. Having lost the features of activeness inherent in the group dominants, the individual consciousness finds a number of properties distinguishing the personality, but usually impeded by the purposeful activeness of the large groups.

From the editorial board--A.A. Kutsenkov. Having appealed to the participants in the discussion of problems of mass consciousness in the Afro-Asian countries, the journal's editorial board set itself several tasks: first, to attract the attention of the scientific community and the journal's readers to this insufficiently studied problem; second, to specify the "mass consciousness" concept with reference to the conditions of the Afro-Asian countries and, third, to sum up if only the most general results of the development of this as yet comparatively new field of research in oriental studies and Africanistics.

While paying tribute to the opinions and judgments of the roundtable participants and not presuming to obtain exhaustive answers to all questions connected with problems of mass consciousness in Asia and Africa, the editorial board would like to express the following considerations:

1. In respect of the Afro-Asian world the term "mass consciousness" is in need of further clarification. The principles of the separation of this category--social or structural?--are not entirely clear. To which social strata, classes and groups specifically is this category related? Does it extend only to the strata and groups not connected with modern forms of production or does it also embrace the strata and groups of the population which are objectively already incorporated in the sphere of capitalist relationships, but whose consciousness is still at the precapitalist stage of development and so forth? Or is it a question of a different system of intentions--the level of consciousness (elite or mass) itself?

Owing to the vagueness of the content aspect of this concept, the place of the "mass consciousness" in the system of scientific categories established in our science remains unclear.

2. The "mass consciousness" concept implies a complexity and heterogeneity of its content. This is determined by the complexity of the composition of its social vectors and the developing society's material and spiritual living conditions. Primarily a mixture of different social relationships and production modes--patriarchal, small-scale commodity and capitalist. This is also the dissimilarity of social structures, based on the one hand on primary and, on the other, on secondary relations. There is also here a varying degree of modernization of social relationships, a varying degree of the inclusion of strata, groups and institutions and their varying participation in modern means and methods of labor. In other words, the mass consciousness of the members of a clan, tribe, commune, caste, national or religious group and class will differ appreciably among themselves.

And at the same time certain common features, which, properly speaking, constitute the essence of the "mass consciousness" of this developing society or the other, are characteristic of the mass consciousness of these groups. In describing these common features experts usually stress the traditional aspect. But does this term express the essence of this phenomenon sufficiently clearly? We believe that it does not. The consciousness of the masses is everywhere and always more traditional than, say, the consciousness of an educated elite. We believe that this phenomenon is more fully expressed by the term "archaism". It is archaism, that is, the elements of consciousness typical of precapitalist social relationships, which is the most common and typical feature of mass consciousness in the Afro-Asian countries. Another of its characteristic features is syncretism. It would also be possible to distinguish a number of other specific features of this consciousness, many of which have already been revealed in the speeches, while others could be cited additionally.

3. The need was revealed as clearly as could be in the course of the discussion for the further elaboration of the problems of the development of the mass consciousness in the Asian and African countries. The participants in the discussion are unanimous that the mass consciousness is undergoing important changes in these countries and that the entire process is of a complex and extremely contradictory nature.

The main direction of these changes is the gradual ousting and replacement of archaic elements by modern ones. Many of the participants drew attention to the growth of internal conflicts in the structure of the mass consciousness, particularly between archaics and contemporaneity.

At the same time, it would appear to us, an endeavor to dramatize these conflicts unduly, which is manifested particularly graphically in the ideas of certain Western sociologists, distorts the real picture of what is going on. Archaics and contemporaneity in the social consciousness are only antipodes to a certain extent. Were this not so, each developing society would most likely represent a community of neurotics and people with a split consciousness. For this reason it is necessary to also find in the mass consciousness the elements which might serve as a bridge for passage from one to another, often directly opposite, status. And this raises tasks of a study

of the structure of the mass consciousness and the dynamics of its self-development. Even at the earliest stages of its evolution there exists in the archaic consciousness both an empirical level which correctly reflects if only some of the practically most important properties and connections of the surrounding world and a "philosophical" level on which man and society explain the world and its relationships. The empirical level contains possibilities of the rationalization and desacralization of the consciousness and an orientation toward material, property and "attainable" values.

Of course, the process of development of the mass consciousness is accompanied by a growth of internal conflicts. But at the same time the mass consciousness has its own mechanisms of removing contradictions which arise. It is well known that the consciousness also is modified with the diffusion and multiplication of roles of the personality in society, splitting into individual and comparatively independent spheres--each sphere of vital activity with its own corresponding values and orientations. Man behaves in one way in the home, in another way at work and in yet another way in the temple. The development of the mass consciousness amounts not only to archaic values yielding positions along the entire front but also to a reorganization of the hierarchy of values and the values themselves changing places and being suffused with new meaning.

I believe that the exchange of opinions within the roundtable framework has touched on important aspects of the problem and has been useful. The editorial board expresses gratitude to its participants and is sure that further study of the questions raised in the course of the discussion will be reflected in new publications in our journal.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki", Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury", 1982

8850

CSO: 1807/109

ADVANTAGES OF SOVIET AID TO DEVELOPING STATES DESCRIBED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, 1982 pp 3-12

[Article by Petr Yakovlevich Koshelev, candidate of geographical sciences, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and specialist in the economic cooperation of the USSR and foreign countries: "The USSR's Economic Cooperation With African States"]

[Excerpt] The USSR's trade-economic relations with the independent African states expanded intensively in the 1970's and presently represent a significant component of the Soviet Union's foreign economic activity. The USSR's reciprocal commodity turnover with African countries doubled in the past decade, constituting R2 billion in 1980.* This was one-sixth of the volume of the USSR's trade with the developing countries. On the African continent the Soviet Union has approximately 40 trading partner-states with which intergovernmental trade agreements have been concluded. These agreements reflect the parties' interest in reciprocal commodity supplies, a refinement of the import-export structure and the corresponding plan-based improvement in the division of labor between the countries which have concluded an agreement.

The USSR supplies machinery, equipment and various other commodities of a predominantly production purpose, thereby assisting the partners to ease their dependence on the world capitalist market in an area where it was once absolute and remains considerable even now. Reciprocal purchases in the African countries of products of their farming and young national industry are also profitable to both sides. The prices with which Soviet organizations conduct foreign trade transactions are established with regard for world conditions and trends; at the same time these organizations construct their price policy with regard for the special requirements and possibilities of the partners among the least developed countries and, where necessary, agree to deviate from the world price in favor of the partner.

Together with the growth of trade in finished products and raw material commodities traded in complete sets of equipment (fully equipped facilities) and comprehensive studies (services), including technology transfers, that is,

*Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1980g. Statisticheskiy sbornik" [USSR Foreign Trade in 1980. Statistical Handbook], Moscow, 1981, pp 12-13.

the form of foreign economic relations which it is customary to call economic and technical cooperation, has been developed particularly. Such cooperation incorporates a big package of operations, including preliminary studies and the compilation of technical-economic substantiation of the construction of projects, the development of technical documents, supplies of production and construction equipment and material lacking in this country or the other, the assignment of Soviet specialists to render technical assistance in the construction and installation of equipment and its commissioning and, where necessary, ensuring the subsequent normal operation of projects built with Soviet assistance and also the training of skilled national personnel.

With this form of cooperation economic relations between states, going beyond the framework of purely trade relations and extending to the sphere of capital construction and material production, become far more profound, long-term and stable. They make it possible to tackle most efficiently the task of the reorganization of the economy and the entire social life of the developing countries on a progressive basis.

Understanding the great significance of this cooperation for the creation and strengthening of the economic potential of the emergent countries, the CPSU and the USSR Government have paid and continue to pay great attention to questions of an increase in its efficiency and a refinement of its forms and methods. L.I. Brezhnev observed in the report at the 26th CPSU Congress: "With the emergent states we are developing extensive economic and scientific-technical cooperation profitable to both parties. A big place in our relations is occupied by the construction in these states of large-scale economic projects with this or the other form of the USSR's participation."*

The USSR currently has intergovernmental agreements on economic and technical cooperation with 65 emergent Asian, African and Latin American states. Approximately 700 projects have been built and commissioned in the said countries with the Soviet Union's assistance in accordance with these agreements.

Soviet exports of the equipment of complete enterprises to the emergent Asian and African states increased more than fivefold in the period from 1961 through 1970 and by a factor of a further 2.2 in the period from 1971 through 1980; it may be expected that this volume will at least double in the 1980's. If it is considered that the starting point (1961) was in a period when the volume of cooperation was very considerable (large-industrial and power-engineering facilities were being built in India, Egypt and other countries), the steady high rate of growth of the USSR's cooperation with the emergent Asian and African states is obvious.

A characteristic feature of the USSR's economic and technical cooperation with the developing countries is its bias toward the sphere of material production.

*"Material of the 26th CPSU Congress," p 12.

To speak of the African countries, a sectorial structure of cooperation with them is characterized by the data adduced in the table.

	Proportion of cooperation volume (%)
Industry, power engineering	78
Agriculture	4.8
Transport and communications	3.7
Geology and prospecting	4.1
Training of national personnel, development of science, health care and others	9.4

It should be noted that in the industrially developed capitalist states production enterprises account for 15-40 percent of the volume of their "official development aid" to the emergent countries. A considerable proportion of the industrial facilities here is represented by enterprises not of a complete production cycle but a variety of assembly plants dependent (sometimes 70-80 percent) on intermediate product and component imports from the developed countries.

Without belittling the significance of facilities of the infrastructure in the emergent countries' socioeconomic development, we would note that, nonetheless, the greatest economic result may be obtained from production facilities, particularly from large-scale production complexes. Such facilities and complexes develop a country's economic potential, extend its export opportunities, ensure employment of the population, create the resources for them to be self-supporting and contribute to an increase in accumulations, which could be channeled into the installation of other facilities. The creation of production projects is in the majority of instances a far more complex process connected with an increased degree of responsibility and risk than the installation of projects of the general and social infrastructure. This is, evidently, a principle reason why private foreign companies prefer to install projects of the infrastructure in the Asian and African countries--the risk is far less, while the profit norm in these countries is, in the estimation of Western economists, higher by a factor of 2-2.5 than in the developed capitalist states.

The end results of the Soviet Union's cooperation with the emergent Asian and African countries from the viewpoint of the development of their economic potential may be illustrated by the following data on the overall capacity of the main projects built, being built and due to be built with the USSR's assistance as of the start of 1981:

	Unit of measurement	Provided for by agreements	Including that built and commissioned
Installed power			
station capacity	kilowatts, millions	15.8	7.4
Pig iron	tons, millions	26.9	10.8
Steel	"	26.1	9.3
Rolled metal	"	21.7	7.5
Iron ore	"	13	10.9
Coal (production)	"	50.3	4.8
Oil (production)	"	66	62
Mineral fertilizer	"	105	105
Large-panel housing			
construction	square meters of living space, millions	3.5	0.5
Irrigation and land			
reclamation	hectares, thousands	737.8	156.4
Railroads	kilometers, thousands	2.1	1.7
Highways	"	2.1	2.1

If we evaluate the potential that has been created and is now being created in just three sectors (power engineering, ferrous metallurgy and oil production) in 1981 world prices, the value of their product is in excess of R25 billion a year--this testifies to the grand scale of the Soviet Union's cooperation with Asian and African countries and proves the groundlessness of the assertion of bourgeois propaganda concerning the "negligible" amounts of USSR assistance to the young emergent states' economic development.

The creation with the USSR's assistance of large-scale facilities in the base sectors of the emergent states' economy is forcing the capitalist monopolies also to engage in the construction of heavy industry enterprises in these countries, although this is contrary to their strategic goals--preservation for former colonies of the role of raw material appendages and sales markets for their industrial products. This is an important side effect of the USSR's cooperation with the emergent states and this cooperation's bias in favor of the production sphere.

The Soviet Union has never participated and does not now participate in the export of capital and the acquisition of profits or in exploitation of the partners to the cooperation. In expanding economic and technical cooperation with the emergent states the USSR proceeds from the task of use of the possibilities and advantages of the international division of labor on the basis of the partners' mutual benefit..

The Soviet Union cooperates with the Asian and African countries on various terms, upon the determination of which account is taken both of the technical-economic data of the projects and the financial-economic position of the partner: cooperation is exercised with a number of countries with respect to certain projects on conventional business terms, and sometimes Soviet organizations' services are paid for in cash. In cooperation with many African

countries the USSR grants official credit to pay for the expenditure of Soviet organizations connected with assistance in the installation of projects--this credit is extended at a favorable annual rate of interest with repayment over 8-10 and more years; the Soviet Union frequently agrees to the repayment of credit not in currency but supplies of traditional export commodities or part of the products produced at the cooperation facilities, which facilitates considerably the partners' debt repayment.

The Soviet side also derives economic benefits from cooperation with the developing countries. In supplying the developing countries with full-set equipment and technical documents, sending its specialists on assignment and granting, where necessary, credit for the financing of capital construction the Soviet Union obtains in the form of compensation commodities necessary for its national economy--mineral raw material, tropical farming products and finished industrial products, including those of enterprises built with the USSR's assistance. In the latter case compensation cooperation is taking shape which is enjoying increasingly extensive development.

Many commodities extracted and produced at enterprises built with the USSR's assistance are currently exported from the developing countries to the Soviet Union--oil, natural gas, bauxites, alumina, ferrous and nonferrous metals, yarn, canned goods and certain types of machinery and equipment. The proportion of products of cooperation projects constituted an average of 17 percent in the period 1976-1980 in the USSR's imports from all developing countries. This not only contributes to satisfaction of the Soviet economy's need for commodities in short supply on a stable contractual basis but also makes an important contribution to the accomplishment of the tasks of ensuring the solvency of a number of countries, an increase in their export potential and the on-schedule repayment of Soviet credit. As of the present the Soviet Union has concluded approximately 30 agreements of a compensation nature with the developing countries. Negotiations are under way or the necessary preliminary studies and technical-economic substantiation are being performed in respect of a considerable number of new projects of compensation cooperation.

While extensively publicizing the favorable terms of the Western countries' "official development aid" to the emergent states and the high proportion of subsidies in it bourgeois propaganda deliberately remains silent about the fact that this government "aid" constitutes a very modest share (25-26 percent in 1979-1980) of total exports of capital to the emergent countries, a large part of which is effected on very tough terms by private banks and companies.

In its accounts the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) employs such a synthetic indicator of foreign financing terms as the "grant element" (which is calculated as the coefficient of percentage "lost profit" for the creditor--the higher the percentage, the greater the favorability of the credit, 100 percent signifying a gift). IBRD experts here deduce a single "grant element" indicator, amalgamating within it both the terms of the government "aid" and the terms of private bank and company credit. According to the calculations of IBRD experts, the "grant element" of Western "aid" to all developing countries in the period from 1970 through 1978 fell from 37 to 22 percent and for the countries of Tropical Africa from 46 to 31 percent, that is, the terms toughened by more than 30 percent. Calculated

in accordance with this same method, the "grant element" of the terms of the credit extended to the African countries by the Soviet Union for purposes of economic cooperation is in the 38-58-percent range, which attests the far more favorable--compared with the terms of Western "aid"--terms of Soviet economic cooperation with the African countries.

The industrially developed capitalist countries' "aid" to the emergent states represents a well organized and, as a rule, carefully concealed mechanism of neocolonialist plunder of the former colonies whereby the bourgeois state grants favorable credit and subsidies (ultimately at the expense of the ordinary taxpayers and working people) while the private banks and companies gain for themselves under this official cover very profitable sales markets for their capital, obtaining here a profit norm higher by a factor of 2-2.5 than in their own countries. In the estimation of UNCTAD experts, in 1980 alone private monopolies exported from the developing countries profit of the order of more than \$25 billion. The increasing activeness of "big business" in the emergent states (in the period 1971 through 1979 their indebtedness to private banks and companies, not counting export credit, increased from \$16.6 billion to \$148.6 billion, that is, a ninefold increase almost) has led to an increasingly large proportion of these states' national income being channeled into the payment of exorbitantly high credit interest rates--in 1979 the payment of interest amounted to \$29 billion out of total payments of \$72.3 billion, that is, almost 40 percent.

The adduced examples show the fundamental difference between our cooperation and the so-called "aid" of the developed capitalist countries.

The following features are characteristic of the USSR's economic and technical cooperation with the developing countries:

priority is given to assistance in the development of the state sector in various branches of the economy, which enhances the state's possibilities in effecting socioeconomic transformations, strengthens its positions in the struggle against foreign monopolies and increases the state's possibilities in the pursuit of an independent policy in the sphere of world economic relations;

cooperation is exercised on a long-term basis, on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, as a rule, which enables the partners to better plan the use of their resources for achieving the strategic goals of socioeconomic development over the long term; and

the comprehensive nature of the cooperation permitting the stage-by-stage formation of large-scale economic, territorial and production complexes for the accomplishment of the most important tasks of the country's socioeconomic development, which is supported by assistance in the creation of numerous elements of the complex--from the training of personnel through assistance in the organization of sales of the finished product.

The role of assistance in the organization and improvement of a system of the current and long-term planning of the partners' socioeconomic development is increasing in the Soviet Union's economic cooperation with the developing

countries. The transition from short-term program-plans of a recommendatory nature to a system of scientifically substantiated current and long-term planning based on priority areas of development with a comprehensive consideration of the possibilities of the use of the country's labor and natural resources is objectively important for all developing states. The countries of a socialist orientation currently have the greatest opportunity for effecting such a transition. Cooperation in the planning sphere is developing with the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique, Socialist Ethiopia, the People's Republic of Congo and a number of other states.

The Soviet Union's cooperation with countries of the African continent is characterized by a high growth rate: its volume more than tripled in the 1960's, and there was a further fourfold increase almost in the 1970's.

It needs to be noted that there are certain factors limiting the Soviet Union's possibilities with respect to the development of economic and technical cooperation with the emergent, particularly African, states:

Soviet organizations' lack of the necessary experience of plant-growing and animal husbandry under tropical conditions;

appreciable differences in the technical parameters of the equipment manufactured by USSR industry compared with the needs of small African countries (the Soviet Union produces single power units of a minimum capacity of approximately 100,000 kilowatts, metallurgical complexes of 1-1.3 million tons of steel a year and so forth);

limited possibilities for the construction of railroads and motor roads in foreign countries in connection with the very intensive plans for the modernization and building of roads within our country over the next 10-15 years; and

under the conditions of the planned development of the economy Soviet organizations must know in advance the technical parameters of the large-scale cooperation projects which it is planned to create in order to provide in good time in the 5-year and annual plans for the manufacture of the necessary equipment--in our country there is no surplus complete-set equipment at warehouses for which we are seeking customers.

The Soviet Union would like to increase the volume of economic and technical cooperation with the developing countries even more rapidly, however; it is forced, as is known, to shoulder a heavy burden to maintain a rough equivalence of military might with the opposed forces of imperialism, which are continuing to inflame the international political atmosphere, increasing the danger of nuclear catastrophe. The Soviet Union's calls for a reduction in military budgets, for the sake of an increase in development assistance included, have yet to meet with a positive response in the West. This cannot, of course, fail to limit our possibilities in economic cooperation with foreign countries.

The socialist countries account for approximately 60 percent of the USSR's total economic and technical cooperation with foreign countries; the emergent Asian countries 22 percent and emergent African countries 18 percent; and cooperation with the Latin American countries is only just beginning to develop.

Intergovernmental agreements provide for the Soviet Union to assist in the construction in African countries of more than 500 projects (more than 160 of these being industrial enterprises). Some 286 facilities have already been built and commissioned, including more than 100 industrial enterprises (26 power engineering projects, 15 ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical and also mining industry facilities, 8 oil and gas industry facilities, 26 metal-working and equipment maintenance facilities, 14 food industry facilities and so forth).

A most acute socioeconomic problem confronting the African countries is that of self-sufficiency in food. According to FAO data, per capita food production in Tropical Africa in the last 2-3 years fell approximately 5 percent compared with the 1970 level. In the period 1970 through 1978 African countries increased food imports from 4.2 million to 11 million tons per year; it is expected that by 1985 food imports will be in excess of 15 million tons. The seriousness of this problem is also emphasized by the fact that the existing level of food consumption (number of calories per capita per day) in Africa is 25-30 percent below the scientifically substantiated norms.

Understanding the entire importance of the solution of this problem in the plane of a strengthening of the African countries' economic independence, the Soviet Union is assisting them in the creation of approximately 70 agricultural facilities, including 15 state farms and livestock sections, 35 facilities for the irrigation and development of new land and a large number of elevators and warehouses for the storage of agricultural products, veterinary and plant pathology laboratories and testing stations. The USSR is cooperating successfully with a number of African countries in the development of ocean fishing.

The Soviet Union is actively assisting countries of North Africa and the Near and Middle East to expand tracts of irrigable land in this arid zone. The extent of Soviet organizations' participation in the realization of large-scale irrigation projects varies--from assistance in the planning of irrigation systems through work on the irrigation of land tracts on contractual terms--but as a whole the countries of the said regions have assimilated or are assimilating with the USSR's assistance irrigable land tracts of an overall area of 3-4 million hectares; this creates the potential for the cultivation of up to 10-12 million tons of grain a year (if we reckon on one harvest a year with the possibility of two harvests), which is comparable to the amount of their grain imports in recent years.

Great attention in the USSR's cooperation with the African countries is paid to the training of national personnel of various levels. Over the years of cooperation Soviet specialists have trained approximately 150,000 skilled workers directly at the place of work at the time of the installation of various projects; many workers have improved their skills and become foremen and team leaders, and special classes for worker training have been organized at major facilities both with time off and without time off from work.

The training of national personnel at enterprises and in VUZ's of the Soviet Union has assumed large proportions. In accordance with the wishes of many countries, students have been admitted in recent years specifically for training in specialties needed for working at facilities built and under construction within the framework of these countries' cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Together with the training of national personnel in the course of construction at places of work and in the USSR the Soviet Union is assisting the African countries in the creation of over 140 educational institutions: 18 higher educational institutions, of which 10 have been built and are operating successfully with the participation of Soviet professorial-lecturer personnel, graduating hundreds of engineers, field managers and other specialists annually; 20 technical schools and colleges (secondary specialized educational institutions) for the training of team leaders, foremen, instructors and other technical specialists--7 of them have already been commissioned and are training national personnel; and 102 vocational-technical instruction centers for the training of skilled workers of the mass occupations, 72 of which have already been created, and Soviet specialists participate in the teaching in many of them.

The USSR's cooperation in the training of national personnel is valued highly by the leaders of many African countries. The creation in these countries of a network of educational institutions of various levels has made it possible to train national personnel more efficiently, bringing their curricula as close as possible to the country's actual conditions and concrete needs. The organization of a system of vocational-technical instruction centers is affording an opportunity for training highly skilled workers locally, enlisting in the sphere of modern developed production large detachments of the African youth, which gradually will be able to replace the large detachments of foreign skilled personnel which the African countries are still forced to enlist at the present time for the installation of various complex facilities, spending large sums on this.

The construction with the USSR's assistance of a large number of major enterprises and facilities of key significance has a further important economic and social aspect--it is leading to an appreciable increase in employment and actively contributing to the solution of the problem of the reduction and elimination of unemployment, which is extraordinarily urgent for many of the continent's developing countries. Approximately 500,000 workers and engineering-technical personnel, including more than 100,000 in African countries, are currently employed at projects built in the developing countries with the USSR's assistance.

Considering the inadequate state of geological study of the majority of African countries, the Soviet Union is cooperating extensively with them in performing the necessary research--from the compilation of geological charts and survey operations for various types of minerals through geological prospecting for a detailed technical-economic evaluation of the deposits. Some 53 geological survey projects in many African countries have been carried out and are to be carried out with the assistance of Soviet geologists; work has already been completed and large and medium deposits of solid mineral resources have been discovered at 26 of them. National geological services have been created with the USSR's assistance in a number of African countries capable of independently performing efficient geological surveys with the constantly diminishing participation of highly skilled Soviet specialists in this work.

Soviet business organizations undertake, in the main, the fulfillment of commitments within the framework of economic cooperation with the emergent countries:

on technical-assistance terms, when the administrative and organizational aspects of the construction of a facility are handled by the client-country, and Soviet organizations assist in planning-survey work, supply equipment, materials and spares and send specialists on assignment for the installation of equipment and help in the construction of the facility and also for assistance in its subsequent operation; and

on contract terms, when the appropriate Soviet organizations assume full responsibility (administrative-organizational included) for the construction of a facility and deliver it to the client in finished form. The first form of cooperation accounts on average for a little more than half of the USSR's cooperation with the emergent countries, and the proportion of the second form has been increasing in recent years, particularly in countries of a high solvency.

At first sight the construction of production facilities on contract terms would appear more attractive for the client, whose concerns are reduced merely to the functions of supervising the activity of the foreign organization installing the facility in accordance with the agreed contract. However, with this form of cooperation organizations of the partner-country do not gain essential practical experience of the installation of complex business projects, and for the construction of the next such project the government will again be forced to invite a foreign firm.

In the practice of the Soviet Union's cooperation with the developing countries there are many examples of national construction organizations acquiring in time in the course of the installation of facilities with the USSR's technical assistance sufficient organizational-administrative and technological experience enabling them at subsequent stages to enlist increasingly few foreign specialists for construction, installation and other complex operations. Therefore in the plane of long-term future tasks the "technical assistance" form is preferable to the contract for the developing countries.

All the prerequisites exist for an appreciable expansion of the USSR's economic and technical cooperation with the African countries throughout the 1980's. Construction has begun in Nigeria of a full-cycle foundry (iron-making) with a capacity at the first stage of 1.3 million tons of steel annually. There will be a considerable increase in cooperation with Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola, with which many important economic projects in various sectors of the economy have already been agreed. Cooperation with Madagascar, Zambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Tanzania and other African countries will be developed. Big projects in the base sectors of the economy are to be realized by Soviet organizations in Algeria, Libya and Morocco.

As a whole, the prospects of the development of the USSR's economic and technical cooperation with African countries in the current decade appear favorable. Accomplishment of the tasks set by the 26th CPSU Congress for the preferential growth rate of the production of engineering products, an increase in the scale of the creation, assimilation and introduction in production of new highly efficient equipment and its increased competitiveness in foreign

markets will create additional possibilities for a further considerable expansion of cooperation.

An improvement in the qualitative characteristics of the USSR's cooperation with African countries will continue in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Efforts will be channeled primarily into large-scale base facilities of the economy of the African countries, among which are the full-cycle foundry in Nigeria, coal mines in Mozambique, hydropower stations and power lines in Angola and Ethiopia, mining enterprises in Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia and on Madagascar, a nuclear power station and a number of other major plants in Libya, a shale-oil heat and electric power plant and a phosphorite-extraction complex in Morocco and so forth. Assistance will be increased in the development of agriculture, particularly in the expansion of sown areas and an increase in the efficiency of agricultural production in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and a number of other countries.

Together with the proven forms of cooperation--technical assistance and the contract, including the "turnkey" installation of projects--multilateral cooperation with the participation both of other socialist countries and also companies of certain developed capitalist states will be further developed. Cooperation with certain countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique) will be effected on the basis of jointly developed long-term programs of a 5-10-year period in close connection with the plans of our countries' socioeconomic development. The prospects of the development of Soviet-African trade, which will increase appreciably in the coming decade, are favorable.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki", Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury",
1982

8850

CSO: 1807/109

BOURGEOIS CONCEPTS OF THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, 1982 pp 169-173

[A.V. Gordon review of B.S. Starostin book "Sotsial'noye obnovleniye: skhemy i real'nost'. (Kriticheskiy analiz burzhuaznykh kontseptsii modernizatsii razvivayushchikhsya stran)" ((Social Renovation: Plans and Reality (Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Concepts of the Modernization of the Developing Countries))), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp 182]

[Text] The work in question has been published in the "Social Progress and Bourgeois Philosophy" series. The inclusion of a book on non-Marxist theories of the development of the emergent countries in a series of publications devoted to the most important directions of bourgeois social thought of the current era may be considered symptomatic and profoundly regular. The author himself reveals this regularity when he writes in the foreword that the problems of "social progress in a vast zone of our planet represented by more than 100 states backward in their economic development" are a part of "the global problems currently confronting mankind" (pp 3-4). Whence the important place of the set of problems of the developing countries in the contemporary ideological struggle. Whence bourgeois social science's ever increasing attention to the emergent countries' development paths.

Roughly in the mid-1950's, when on the European continent a certain balance of forces had been established and in Asia and Africa the decolonization process was proceeding toward completion and when the young states were confronted sharply with the question of the social and foreign policy orientation, a kind of boom of research into that conglomerate which was termed the "third world" began in the West--in the wake of a certain change in the accents in imperialism's military-political and economic strategy. This stream of literature included mainly the studies of economists, sociologists and political scientists. The methods typical of these branches of knowledge markedly superseded traditional philological and ethnographic methods of the study of non-European peoples. Special disciplines like economic growth theories, development sociology and socio-psychological study of the "modernization of the personality" evolved or underwent new development with reference to the problems of the developing countries. Fulfilling a new social mandate, theoretical thought worked intensively.

Soviet scholars noted in good time the new trends in the development of bourgeois social science and sharply criticized the concepts which it put forward for an explanation of the reasons for underdevelopment and the prospects of surmounting it. However, this criticism was sometimes conducted by counter-propaganda methods and assumed the nature of "Red Guard attacks on capital". In an endeavor to provide a Marxist-Leninist alternative to the concepts of bourgeois social science an unduly rectilinear path was frequently chosen, and the alternative acquired the features of a "negative": all the conclusions to be found in the works of bourgeois scholars were cut off at the doorstep, so to speak, and slogan was counterposed to slogan, one ideological principle to another and counterproposition to proposition. This was essentially the first stage of Soviet orientalists' and Africanists' acquaintance with Western theories of the Afro-Asian countries' development, which were, furthermore, at that time distinguished by the most avowed apologetics.

In the latter half of the 1960's a new stage began characterized by a more concentrated study of non-Marxist development theories and the elaboration as a basis for a critique thereof of a Marxist approach to an analysis of the development of the emergent countries. As a result Soviet scholars' monographs which examine Western science's economic, sociological and political science theories concerning the developing countries on a sound research level appeared one after the other in the last 5-year period.¹ The book in question also belongs among these summary studies. Like the other works also, it is characterized by certain general features--primarily the author's endeavor to convey the basic content of the concepts in question and to analyze them thoroughly with regard not only for conclusions but also arguments and not only ideological but also logical grounds. At the same time B.S. Starostin's book occupies a special place in the above-mentioned category.

Among the various disciplines whose methods are used by Soviet scholars in an examination of current problems of Asian, African and Latin American countries B.S. Starostin presents philosophy, and this is manifested in the consistent application in the book in question of the historical-philosophical approach. The author invariably begins an analysis of sociological and other bourgeois development theories with a disclosure of their ideological-theoretical sources. Describing the economic "growth models," the author mentions J. Keynes and J. Schumpeter; analyzing political science concepts stressing the significance of elites in the progress of the developing countries, he devotes several pages to the Italian sociologists of the turn of the century V. Pareto and G. Mosca, who are considered classical authors of the elite approach in contemporary bourgeois sociology; providing a general assessment of development sociology, he characterizes the functionalism of the British school of social anthropology (B. Malinowski, A. Radcliffe-Brown) and the structural-functional analysis developed by the American sociological school (T. Parsons, R. Merton); not only the names M. Weber and E. Durkheim, which are customary, but also O. Conte and H. Spencer and also the ethnographer-evolutionists of the 19th century I. Bachofen, G. Maine, J. McLennan, E. Taylor, L. Morgan, G. Fraser and others are cited as the spiritual fathers of the modernization concept which is predominant in development sociology. Such a broad historical-philosophical approach has enabled B.S. Starostin to introduce theories fashioned in our day under the influence of concrete tasks of the contemporary development of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the general channel of the evolution of bourgeois social thought of the 19th-20th centuries.

In characterizing in the example of development sociology the present stage of this evolution B.S. Starostin emphasizes primarily the elements of continuity. A methodology whose basis consists of positivism and evolutionism, which evolved back in the latter half of the last century. This is the very idea of development as modernization, which was born by the notion, also formed in the 19th century, identifying the world-historical process with the ascent of all peoples to capitalism--the notion of bourgeois society as the highest stage and pinnacle of social development. This is the logic of scientific cognition based, as on crutches, on dichotomous structures of the "modern society-traditional society" type. Particular mention should be made of the latter. Marxist-Leninist criticism of Western sociological theories has already turned attention to the characteristic tendency to interpret social development within the framework of various binary oppositions like "agrarian-industrial," "rural masses-urban society," "sacred-secular" and "static-dynamic". The third chapter of the book in question introduces, I believe, an essential addition to the disclosure of this limitation of bourgeois development theories.

B.S. Starostin sees the concept of [F. Tönnies], who classified historically different human collectives on the basis of the "commune-society" dichotomy, E. Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity" and "organic solidarity" societies, the irrational and rational systems of M. Weber and other sociological models put forward at the turn of the century as landmarks of the prehistory of the modern "traditional society" concept, which in Western development theories denotes both the precolonial and postcolonial social structures of the majority of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries--everything which in these theories represents the "object of modernization" and the antithesis of "modern society". He notes the comparatively abrupt most recent evolution of the "traditional society" concept: from the vulgarian-economic interpretation of W. Rostow, who divided society into "pre-Newton" and "post-Newton," to the more subtle sociological descriptions of D. Apter, W. Moore and D. Lerner with their attempts to lessen the sharpness of dichotomism (in the spirit of the differentiation of the "comparatively unmodernized" and "comparatively modernized" societies of M. Levi) and, finally, to the efforts to surmount the "traditional-modern" dichotomism itself in the concepts of the "diffraction" and "prismatic" societies of F. Riggs and the "patrimonial" and "neopatrimonial" structures of S. Eisenstadt.

But in all the varieties of bourgeois scholars' interpretation of the "traditional society" concept B.S. Starostin discerns a characteristic flaw: dichotomism leads to the metaphysical counterpositioning of some types of society to others and the deduction of one type from another as its antipode. As a result, on an analysis of the concrete-historical features of Afro-Asian and Latin American societies has been superimposed a version of the "traditional society" which was formed as an "anti-outline" of the "modern society," and features of the bourgeois societies of Europe and North America of recent and most recent times are collated in this concept. Typological differences have been reduced to the category of contrasts of "modern spirit" and "traditional spirit": in the cultural plane "universalism-particularism" and in the socio-economic respect "functional specialization-diffuse (amorphous) functioning"; and in the socio-psychological plane a propensity for subordination, fatalism and the incapacity for calculation of the "traditional personality" have been

counterposed to the initiative, enterprise and prudence of the "modern personality". The guiding thread of the analysis for the theorists of modernization was "ascertainment of the absence" (p 146), that is, the experts were essentially oriented not toward a systemic characterization of the societies being studied proceeding from the intrinsic regularities of their vital activity but toward a discovery of the absence of this constituent element or the other of bourgeois society like, for example, capital, industrial technology or the spirit of enterprise.

B.S. Starostin has thus succeeded in revealing, convincingly, I believe, the general weakness of various bourgeois development theories. He has shown primarily that the latest procedure and modern methods of the collection and processing of material often get along well with decrepit theoretical and logical outlines and that the elaboration of new social development theories and "the quest for more efficient methods of sociological research" have come up against bourgeois science's incapacity for "surmounting the stereotypes of traditional theorizing" (p 67). One such stereotype he justifiably termed Eurocentrist. The methodological principles of Western science concerning the "third world" were borrowed from general theories which collated the experience of the development of Western countries and the singularities of the functioning of bourgeois societies (the economic growth theories of Keynes and Schumpeter, structure-functionalism, the theory of elites and so forth). As a result the essential shortcomings of these theories have proven even deeper when applied to the reality of non-Western countries by the mechanical transfer to them of socio-historical models and the inadequacy of the conceptual apparatus (pp 117, 139).

At the same time B.S. Starostin is far from nihilistic criticism. He notes the evolution of these models and the conceptual apparatus under the influence of Western experts' deeper familiarization with the developing countries. He records the sometimes very sharp criticism to which the methodology of Western development theories has been subjected on the part of bourgeois scholars themselves. He advocates a differentiated approach to them, distinguishing honest scholars, conscientious researchers and "serious representatives of bourgeois social science" (p 153). In his critique of non-Marxist research the author of the work in question develops the principles of a dialectical approach. He carefully reveals in this research questions which have been dictated by life itself and the reality of the developing countries and are not duly theoretically substantiated and points out important methodological problems which are insoluble within the framework of bourgeois social science.

In characterizing the scientific-theoretical apparatus of development sociology and examining the application therein of structural and functional analysis, systems theory and the comparative research method B.S. Starostin emphasizes that they are flawed not in themselves and that, on the contrary, these are important and useful instruments of scientific analysis. The defect is their one-sided application and their absolutization and conversion into a "universal method of cognition" (p 50). They reveal their true force in combination with materialist dialectics. "Historical materialism," B.S. Starostin writes, "by no means counterposes itself to system-structural and other concrete methods of analysis but, on the contrary, organically combines them. The

features of each of them are incorporated in Marxist dialectics in 'skimmed' form and synthesized at a qualitatively higher level" (p 68).

A theoretical approach to an analysis of non-Marxist concepts and theories also distinguishes authors of other Soviet works of recent years, who abide in this respect by the propositions repeatedly expressed by V.I. Lenin. Thus, for example, in the book "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," which was written at a time of bourgeois philosophy's most dangerous offensive against the principles of Marxist theory, V.I. Lenin, accusing representatives of bourgeois science in a most acute polemic of being "learned salesmen for the capitalist class," at the same time pointed out: "The task of Marxists...is to be able to assimilate for themselves and rework the gains being made by these 'salesmen' (you will not take a single step forward, for example, in the sphere of study of new economic phenomena without availing yourselves of the works of these salesmen) and be able to chop off their reactionary trend, pursue their own policy and combat with the entire policy the forces and classes hostile to us."² Scientific criticism as a part of Marxist social science is guided by the general principles of a dialectical approach to the phenomena being studied whose essence V.I. Lenin expressed in the well-known formula: "Not outright denial, not vain denial, not skeptical denial...but denial as a connecting factor and as a factor of development, with the retention of what is positive."³

From the viewpoint of the development of science criticism cannot be a self-sufficient value; its purpose is to contribute to the creation of higher knowledge compared with that provided by the scientific concepts being criticized. An awareness of this purpose is characteristic of the authors of recent Soviet publications of the critical genre. "In the development of new knowledge about this subject of research or the other," A.G. Bel'skiy and B.S. Yerasov write in a review of one of them, "great significance is attached together with an analysis of this subject itself to criticism of the evolved and evolving notions concerning it. This approach proves not only essential but also fruitful if this is not criticism for the sake of criticism with a predetermined result but criticism aimed at broadening and amplifying our knowledge of a given subject and its 'manifold' scientific analysis."⁴ They mention in M.A. Cheshkov's work as a most important merit precisely the fact that "discursive criticism of the concepts which exist with respect to the problem organically develops into the author's own original development of the theme."⁵ The task of such, in A.G. Bel'skiy's and B.S. Yerasov's terminology, "heuristic criticism" of the concepts of non-Marxist social science is also being posed by the reviewers of other works devoted to Western theories of the development of the emergent countries.⁶ Unfortunately, as A.G. Bel'skiy and B.S. Yersaov emphasize, examples of the "organic" development of one's own concepts from criticism, that is, such which, like any genuine development, contains in dialectically "skimmed" form positive elements of the concepts being criticized, are as yet "a rare category of research in national social science."⁷

I believe that this is explained to a considerable extent by the confusion in our publications of various types of critical genre. Indeed, far from all authors should be confronted with the task of the creation of original scientific concepts. Or why do we have, say, works of a political-commentary,

propaganda nature with a detailed exposition of the concepts being criticized and a thorough study of their strong and weak aspects? The primary task here is the prompt ascertainment of the new trends in bourgeois ideology and exposure of the scientific or, rather, pseudoscientific substantiation of imperialist strategy. This is an independent form of critical genre which draws its reasoning from scientific-theoretical criticism and at the same time communicates to it its combative, aggressive spirit and takes aim at questions which are pressing in an ideological-political respect. Two types of critical genre are thus closely interconnected; but this interconnection must not develop into the substitution of the one for the other. At times the researcher's main forces are spent on revealing the above-mentioned pseudoscientific principles of the concepts being criticized and by way of a certain compensation for inordinate criticism a comprehensive exposition of these concepts is given alongside and, in the end, the task of the elaboration of original Marxist concepts on the problems in question remains in third place. I believe that in the scientific-theoretical variety of the critical genre it is the latter which should be the cornerstone. Nor is there any need to divorce an exposition of the concepts being analyzed from the criticism of their principles. This is a purely artificial separation. An exposition cannot fail to be critical (if only by what is chosen for exposition and the tone in which it is given). But this criticism should not, of course, become "outright denial" for in that case it alone becomes the factor in the development of original concepts.

There are features of the confusion of various forms of critical genre in the work in question also. B.S. Starostin strives in principle precisely for the organic development of his own concept. The most characteristic example is the already mentioned chapter three. Here he switches from a considered criticism of the principles of various "traditional society" concepts to a description of the singularities of Afro-Asian societies and a disclosure of the role of traditions in their development (pp 84,99-108). This description takes account of the positive aspects contained in non-Marxist theories, takes the questions raised therein as a point of departure and synthesizes the elements of knowledge obtained, but now on a different methodological basis. The costs of the said outline are obvious in other instances. In striving for the presence of all its elements--exposition of the non-Marxist concepts, criticism of their principles and the Marxist alternative--the author naturally cannot find sufficient room and strength for all this. As a result the exposition and the criticism are of an oversimplified nature in certain places, while the task of the elaboration of a Marxist alternative is replaced by the exposition of propositions which are already well known (see pp 161-162, 170).

It should be said for fairness' sake that B.S. Starostin is less guilty of these shortcomings, which I consider typical, than many other authors of works of the critical genre. The size of his book is 1.5-2 times smaller while the edition is 10 times greater than, for example, other of the above-mentioned works. This latter means that the book in question is intended for a broad reading audience, for which, evidently, a detailed examination of the questions broached would have been excessive. On the contrary, tribute should be paid to B.S. Starostin for the fact that, taking the nonspecialist reader primarily as the reference point, he has succeeded in simple and intelligible language and laconic and precise expositions in sketching an extensive list of the ideas and problems connected with the development of Western theories

of the progress of the emergent countries and the development of these countries themselves. As a whole, the book represents a successful example of a synthesis of the historical-philosophical approach and knowledge of oriental studies profitably distinguished both from the sometimes excessively abstract philosophical developments of the said range of problems and from the narrow empiricism of certain publications of oriental studies and Africanistics.

Soviet scientific criticism is directly connected in its development with the evolution of Western social thought, and it may be confidently said that with the appearance of works of the recent period, including the book in question, a further page has been turned in Soviet criticism of non-Marxist theories of the development of the emergent countries. B.S. Starostin has clearly distinguished the basic doctrines of bourgeois development sociology and made a substantiated Marxist evaluation of them. Of course, in a number of propositions his analysis could and should have been more extensive; for example, the "patrimonialism" and "neopatrimonialism" concept merits special examination on the part of Soviet historians engaged in a typology of feudalism in the East; and social psychology specialists should have their say in an evaluation of the "modernization of the personality" research, as should peasantry experts in an evaluation of the "rural society" theory and so forth. But the main thing is that the result of the evolution of the direction of development sociology which was based on the idea of modernization and which in the three postwar decades has predominated in Western science of the developing countries has been summed up. Of course, it could in the immediate future also occupy a big place in academic and nonacademic publications--after all, the theorists of modernization still represent most influential circles in Western science. But the initiative in the elaboration of new development concepts is now switching to other directions. These include, primarily, so-called radical political economy, which is already pretty well known in the Soviet Union by the theorists of the "peripheral economy" or "peripheral capitalism". Also representatives of the ideas of "ecodevelopment," that is, an approach to development from the viewpoint of ecological problems. Finally, these include "development anthropology," which is represented mainly by criticism of Western development theories from the viewpoint of the socio-historical singularities and cultural values of the Afro-Asian societies. A scientific-theoretical analysis of these directions, particularly the two latter, in Soviet science is only just beginning, and the appearance of new works of the scientific-criticism genre should be welcomed, the hope being expressed in conclusion that predecessors' valuable experience will be perceived and certain essential shortcomings overcome here.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, L.I. Reysner, "Razvivayushchiesya strany: ocherk teorii ekonomicheskogo rosta" [The Developing Countries: Outline of Economic Growth Theories], Moscow, 1976; N.A. Lidley, "Burzhuaznyye teorii ekonomicheskogo razvitiya (kriticheskiy analiz)" [Bourgeois Theories of Economic Development (Critical Analysis)], Moscow, 1978; B.I. Slavnyy, "Problema zanyatnosti v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh (kriticheskiy

- analiz teoriy i metodov issledovaniya)" [Problem of Employment in the Developing Countries (Critical Analysis of Theories and Research Methods)], Moscow, 1979; Afrikanskiy gorod (kriticheskiy ocherk zarubezhnykh kontseptsii)" [The African City (Critical Outline of Foreign Concepts)], Moscow, 1979; M.A. Cheshkov, "Kritika predstavleniy o pravyashchikh gruppakh razvivayushchikhsya stran" [Critique of the Ideas Concerning Ruling Groups of the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1979; V.Ye. Chirkin, "Burzhuaznaya politologiya i deystvitel'nost' razvivayushchikhsya stran. Kritika kontseptsii 'politicheskoy modernizatsii'" [Bourgeois Political Science and the Reality of the Developing Countries. Critique of the "Political Modernization" Concept], Moscow, 1980.
2. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 18, p 364.
 3. Ibid., vol 29, p 207.
 4. A.G. Bel'skiy, B.S. Yerasov, (reviewed by M.A. Cheshkov), "Critique of the Ideas Concerning Ruling Groups of the Developing Countries," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 6, 1980, p 187.
 5. Ibid., p 191.
 6. M.S. Meyer (reviewer of) "The African City (Critical Outline of Foreign Concepts)," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 4, 1981, pp 210-214; Yu.G. Aleksandrov (reviewer of) B.I. Slavnyy, "Problem of Employment in the Developing Countries," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 5, 1981, pp 197-204.
 7. NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, NO 6, 1980, p 191.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury", 1982

8850

CSO: 1807/109

BOOK ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLAM REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 2, 1982 pp 173-176

[M.T. Stepanyants review of A.I. Ionova book "Islam v Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii: problemy sovremennoy ideynoy evolyutsii: (Islam in Southeast Asia: Problems of Contemporary Ideological Evolution), Moscow, "Nauka's" Main Editorial Board of Oriental Literature, 1981, pp 263, bibliography pp 239-257, glossary of Muslim terms, pp 257-260, index of names pp 261-263]

[Text] The processes currently being observed in the so-called Muslim countries permit us to speak of a stimulation of the "Islamic factor" not only in domestic but also international policy. The political coloration of the contemporary social movements proclaiming religious slogans is distinguished by diversity and impermanence. In our day the vast majority of movements in these countries, from revolutionary-democratic and anti-imperialist through feudal-theocratic and anticommunist, operates under the banner of Islam. Such an extensive use of the religious feelings of the population and, sometimes, artificial speculation on them are complicating the ascertainment of the true social essence of this movement or the other and the platform of this political party or the other. In this connection there is particular scientific and political relevance in an extended study of Muslim currents in the social thought of the oriental peoples and the revelation of the class content of "Muslim" concepts of the state, socialism and so forth.

A.I. Ionova's monograph is the fruit of the author's many years of work on a study of the Islamic factor in the history, culture, social life and, finally, politics of the Southeast Asian countries. A.I. Ionova's research is distinguished by scientific objectivity, the skillful application of Marxist methodology to the development of historical and religious problems and historiographical erudition.

A.I. Ionova endeavors primarily to ascertain in what way the unevenness of the social development of certain Islamic communities in the Southeast Asian countries is reflected in the development of the corresponding Islamic world-outlook, political, economic and social ideas.

The first part of the book is devoted to an examination of the formation of the region's Muslim communities, the singularities of their Islamization, the status of Islam in constitutional law and also the effect of the mechanism of

the "internal regulation of Muslim activeness". Using numerous official documents (constitutions, government edicts, statistical documents, Islamic organization decisions), material of sociological and ethnographic field studies and also national and foreign literature, A.I. Ionova draws an objective picture of the sociopolitical and spiritual atmosphere in the Southeast Asian countries in the period being studied (from the end of WWII through the mid-1970's). The author has succeeded in showing the typological heterogeneousness of the Muslim communities on the scale of individual states and the region as a whole, whence the diversity of the existing socio-religious relations going back to the initial stage of class formation, the period of the evolution of feudal-traditional foundations and, finally, to the era of the conception and maturation of capitalism.

The second, main, part of the work is devoted to the ideological aspect of the subject, that is, the evolution of Muslim ideological currents. It is written on the basis of the study of a considerable number of works of Muslim theorists. Here A.I. Ionova puts into scientific circulation a new layer of sources drawn from periodical publications of Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines.

Analyzing the ideological evolution of Islam in the period in question, A.I. Ionova shows convincingly that the "general line" of this evolution is a reform process (p 12). The author thereby shares the viewpoint of a number of Soviet scholars (L.R. Polonskaya, M.V. Malyukovskiy, S.F. Levin, Z.I. Levin and others) who consider the evolution of ideas in the contemporary Muslim world not a superficial modernization but a quite radical reforming of the basic tenets of traditional religion in accordance with the requirements of bourgeois development.

The monograph traces the evolution of Muslim ideas in all the main spheres of social life. The author analyzes the religious-world-outlook search in concepts which she characterizes as the "theology of the fall to earth," "Islamic irrationalism" and "Islamic ethics" (part II, chapter 2). Chapter three of the same part critically examines the reform development of political problems connected with nation-state building in Southeast Asia. "Muslim" theories of economic development are analyzed in chapter four, and, finally, the final chapter deals with the social doctrines of Muslim reform.

Such a problem-solving approach to a study of Muslim reform is not methodologically entirely new for Soviet literature, but A.I. Ionova has succeeded in developing it creatively. An attempt has been made for the first time in national Islamic studies' literature at a stage-by-stage characterization of Muslim reform.

The monograph (part II, chapter 1) distinguishes three stages of the reform process corresponding, the author believes, to three stages of socioeconomic development: "The initial stage occurs in an atmosphere of early bourgeois development taking place where a transitional type of socio-religious relations exists, the two subsequent stages where a contemporary-modernized type of such relations has been established" (p 108). Amplifying the description of the second stage, A.I. Ionova writes that it is connected "with a higher stage

of the maturation of bourgeois relationships" and pertains to the period "when the question 'who wins' has manifestly been decided in favor of the overthrowers of the feudal-traditional foundations" (p 110). The third stage of reform represents, according to the author, a "kind of reaction to the crisis phenomena in the state of bourgeois society and a certain decline in religiosity under the influence on the one hand of the scientific-technical revolution and, on the other, the fact that in an atmosphere of a comparatively high degree of maturation of the contradictions between labor and capital an even larger proportion of the working people has begun to be aware of the interconnection of the historical doom of capitalism and the appeal of its defenders to the conformist potential of religion for the purpose of the spiritual pacification of the exploited" (pp 116-117).

We have to agree with the author that "the genesis of capitalism influenced the kind of problems which moved to the center of ideological development and the extent of their solution" (p 108). At the same time the characterization of the said stages provided by A.I. Ionova gives rise to certain doubts. Primarily, their very description with respect to the history of the Southeast Asian countries is distinguished, it seems to us, by a certain nebulosity, particularly when it is a question of the boundaries between the second and third stages. In this sense the author's position is expressed more clearly in an earlier article of hers, in which she says that the initial stage of Muslim reform in the region in question corresponds to the period of the conception and the "two subsequent stages to the times of the maturation and, subsequently, structural crisis of the capitalist formations."*

Further on, another question arises: how legitimate is the separation of the third--"crisis"--period in the development of bourgeois relationships in Southeast Asia and is it not premature to speak of a sufficiently high "degree of maturation of the contradictions between labor and capital," which is usually characteristic of the mature capitalist society? And, finally, if we agree with the author's evaluation of the third stage as a "crisis" stage, it has to be admitted that the ideological evolution of this period goes beyond the framework of religious reformation since the latter is the ideological transformation of traditional belief limited by certain temporal boundaries, namely, a period of the breakup of feudal and the development of bourgeois relationships. In other words, it is hardly correct to interpret reform so expansively, relating to it all kinds of attempts at Islam's modernization.

A.I. Ionova formulated her periodization of reform on the basis of material of the Southeast Asian countries, and the classification she suggests could not fail to reflect the regional specifics of the historical process. It would be useful, however, to look at the problem from a more general viewpoint presenting the evolution of Muslim reform in a broader, Afro-Asian, framework. This would possibly permit the emendation of conclusions obtained at the concrete-regional level. It would seem fitting in this connection to turn to the analysis of the reformation process in the works of the well-known Dutch

*A.I. Ionova, "Contemporary Ideological Evolution of Islam (in the Example of Southeast Asia)," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 6, 1979, p 27.

orientalist W.F. Wertheim, who makes the basis of a periodization of Muslim reformation (as also, incidentally, Hindu and Buddhist) the criterion of Asian society's reaction to the development of capitalism. Wertheim attributes to the first stage the period of mass movements of peasants and artisans protesting the capitalist relationships which had arisen. He calls these movements (particularly Wahhabism and the Padri sectarian movement on Sumatra) "rejection movements" and notes that their social ideal was the "original (that is, pre-capitalist--M.S.) agrarian order."* Wertheim draws a parallel between them and Lutheranism inasmuch as he considers the latter "an example of an anti-capitalist movement of artisans and peasants."** The second stage is the period of the ideological activeness of the national bourgeoisie connected with the names of religious educators and humanists like Sayyid Ahmad-khan on the subcontinent of Hindustan, the Muhammadiya ideologists in Indonesia, Muhammad Abduh in Egypt and others. A current of a similar type in Christianity Wertheim considers the Dutch Reform Movement of the start of the 17th century, whose most striking representative was Hugo Grotius. At the third stage, according to Wertheim, "the reform movement as a whole loses its liberal character and becomes more rigid.... The reorientation of Holy Scripture leads to a new orthodoxy and often even to the kind of 'revivalism' involving an appeal to historically early types of religious belief and practice."*** As an example, Wertheim cites the evolution of the "progressivist"-Iqbal into the "reactionary"-Iqbal, the loss of the liberal legacy of the Muhammadiya in the ideology of the Mashumi Party and others. The third stage is connected with the increased sociopolitical role of the petite bourgeoisie. The corresponding stage in Christianity, Wertheim believes, is Calvinism.

The Dutch orientalist has succeeded in correctly discerning the differences in the forms of the manifestation of the Muslim reformation and determining its main motive forces at different stages of development. But he is not accurate, we believe, as far as the distinctiveness of the social thrust of the reform process in its individual periods is concerned. The first stage of this process was indeed connected with the sectarian religious movements of artisans, traders and peasants. This was essentially not yet reformation proper but the approaches thereto. Similar to the medieval heresies, like Hussitism in Europe,**** the sectarian movements in the Muslim world were the harbingers of the approach of social changes. In turning attention merely to the "revivalist" sects, Wertheim thereby ignores Babism, the Ahmadiyah, Mahdism and so forth, that is, precisely the movements which represented the start of the reformation and were marked by a manifestly antifeudal thrust. Furthermore,

*W.F. Wertheim, "Religious Reform Movement in South and South-East," Archives de sociologie des religions" (Clermont), 1961, No 12, p 56.

**Ibid.

***Ibid., p 58.

****Wertheim's comparison of Muslim sectarian movements with Lutheranism appears unfounded inasmuch as the latter did not precede but was truly the ideology of the Reformation, not to mention the fact that Lutheranism was of a distinctly expressed antifeudal nature.

the idealization of early Islam and the campaigning for the restoration of the "purity" of religion characteristic of, say, Wahhabism did not amount merely to an anticapitalist trend but was of far more complex and contradictory social content.

The national bourgeoisie in the person of the humanists and educators acted as the driving force of reformation at the second stage. This was the initial period of the development of capitalist relationships when the bourgeoisie as a class possesses the maximum of progressive potentialities and is distinguished by the greatest degree of liberalism. The reformers of this period are characterized by a "modernist" approach in the sense that the basic tenets and principles of religion are newly interpreted with regard for scientific achievements and the progress of social institutions in the West. The trend toward a synthesis of traditional religious values with bourgeois principles is predominant.

The strengthening of the positions of the bourgeoisie, capitalist relationships' penetration in all spheres of social life and the enlistment of broad strata of the petite bourgeoisie in the system of capitalist production determine the specific features of the third stage. Wertheim is right in mentioning the stimulation of the petite bourgeoisie, but evidently does not take into consideration the entire extent of the contradictoriness of the social position of this class and, whence, the duality of its ideological position. It is for this reason that he speaks only of the conservative, regressivist type of "revivalism," whereas such a type of "revivalism" is a form of the manifestation of "counterreformation" and not reformation. Religious reformation in the form of revivalism is not an indicator of the particular conservative nature of "Islamic civilization". Idealization of the past and the tendency toward forward movement via a renewal of the ideals of antiquity are characteristic of all peoples in different periods of their history. Such a paradoxical form of the expression of an essentially progressive movement is explained by the singularities of the mass consciousness, which associates more easily with the ideals of the new via customary, traditional ideas ("progressivist revivalism").

This three-stage periodization could, we believe, be applied to the reform process in Islam as a general outline. The difficulty, however, is that far from everywhere has the reformation necessarily passed through all three stages. For example, sectarian movements in some countries could take the form of powerful mass demonstrations (like the Babists in Iran), whereas in other countries they have not assumed extensive proportions or are absent altogether.

The problem also is that reformation in Islam is an uneven process embracing individual countries at different times, depending on their level of socio-economic development and the concrete domestic and foreign policy situation. Whence the difference in the forms of manifestation of reform in individual countries and the differing values of its political role. Where precapitalist production and social relationships predominate, reformed Islam could be used by a progressive antifeudal movement. On the other hand, in states where the tasks of bourgeois revolution have been accomplished to a considerable extent, religion performs a reactionary role and has an anticommunist thrust.

In countries which are experiencing a period of the strengthening of national independence and in which the bourgeoisie has not yet exhausted its progressive potentialities, reform ideas could nurture the concepts of various classes and strata, including revolutionary-democratic forces.

We believe that the observations and considerations we have expressed testify that the book in question is a serious study stimulating thought and creative discussion with respect to the most important questions of the contemporary oriental social consciousness.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki". Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury",
1982

8850

CSO: 1807/109

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 82 pp 3-4

[Text] Yordan Baev (Bulgaria). Georgi Dimitrov and the revolutionary struggle in Latin America (on the occasion of the centennial of his birth).....	5
T. V. Goncharova. On ideological-political problems of the nonalignment movement.....	22
Robert R. Kaufman (United States). Political and economic development of Brazil and the countries in the southern tip.....	35
Theories and Concepts of Social Development	
V. V. Razuvayev. Evolution of J. Petras' views.....	41
Discussions, Debates	
Experience of the Latin American model and world literature (conclusion).....	54
Meetings, Interviews	
Talk with Gilberto Vieira, Colombian Communist Party Central Committee secretary general.....	85
Art and Literature	
Dedicated to Nicolas Guillen.....	90
L. A. Kosichev. Pablo O'Higgins' brush and colors.....	103
Searches and Discoveries	
The Maya: Second discovery of civilization	
Yu. V. Knorozov (Leningrad) and G. G. Yershova. Ruler and military leader of "Jaguar's Crossing".....	112

V. I. Gulyayev. Maya "Tablets of Clay".....	123
---	-----

Bookshelf

N. P. Kalmykov. "Kul'tura Brazili" [The Culture of Brazil]. Nauka, Moscow, 1981.....	134
---	-----

P. V. Griбанov. "Molodyye Gosudarstva Karibskogo Basseyna: Problemy Razvitiya" [The Young Countries of the Caribbean Basin: Development Problems]. A. S. Koval'skaya, responsible editor. USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute, Moscow, 1981.....	136
--	-----

V. R. Rayev. "Britain and Latin America: An annual review of British-Latin American relations." Latin America Bureau, London, 1979.....	137
---	-----

Europe and Latin America: An annual review of European-Latin American relations. Latin American Bureau, London, 1980.....	137
--	-----

T. P. Alatalu. "Muutuv Maailm. Ladina-Ameerika" [The Changing World. Latin America]. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn, 1981.....	140
--	-----

Ye. V. Kovalev. "1979. Krizis Ostalsya Pozadi?" [1979. Is the Crisis Behind Us?], UNAM, Mexico, 1980.....	141
--	-----

Scientific Life

M. S. Guseva. Student scientific Latin American seminar.....	143
--	-----

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Latinskaya Amerika", 1982

5003

CSO: 1807/127

IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NONALIGNMENT MOVEMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 82 pp 22-34

[Article by T. V. Goncharova: "On the Ideological-Political Problems of the Nonalignment Movement"]

[Text] The participation of the Latin American countries in the nonalignment movement throughout all of its historical stages has been based on the development programs formulated in the area, in addition to global political factors and the interest in strengthening their sovereignty. By virtue of the considerable differences existing among these countries, their ideological-political orientation in the first place, the nonalignment movement of the Latin American countries developed in the course of a steady conflict among different trends. Despite the existence of common objectives, in particular a vitally important one such as defending its independence under circumstances of intensified imperialist expansion, each of these countries has also hoped to resolve more narrow, regional or national problems. This has frequently resulted in contradictions both among them and with the overall strategic objectives of the movement.

As a whole, active participation in the nonalignment movement is related to a progressive anti-imperialist course and the aspiration to reach new levels of socioeconomic development and to broaden contacts with other developing and socialist countries.

Nonalignment became part of the foreign policy platform of some Latin American countries, based on the idea of a "third way" of development (the case of Peru) or one of the "national socialism" concepts (Guyana's "cooperative socialism" in particular). As R. A. Tuzmukhamedov notes in his work, "Gravitation toward nonalignment is one of the forms of manifestation of the contemporary stage of the national liberation struggle and the struggle for liberation from U. S. domination for Latin American countries." Therefore, although occasionally antisocialist and anti-Soviet trends appear within the nonalignment movement itself, its Latin American contingent has essentially supported the thesis of the need for a rapprochement with the socialist countries.

The participation of Latin America, of Cuba in particular--as the first country on the continent to join the nonalignment movement, a country which has

consistently followed an anti-imperialist course--intensifies the anti-imperialist direction of this organization,² and helps to give priority to its most topical problems. Even despite a sharp turn in the foreign policy course of some countries (Brazil in the mid-1960s or Argentina in the 1970s) they continued to participate in the movement, for independent development and ensuring the necessary conditions for this through unity of action, broadening of reciprocal relations, mutual aid and reciprocal support with a view to creating a certain similarity of integration on a global scale, based on non-alignment, have remained their main basic tasks.

Equally important, in particular, is the intention of some Latin American countries to rely on the support of the movement in resolving disputes, which are mainly of territorial nature. It is entirely natural for the individual participant to try to accomplish his own objectives based on the specific situation. Whereas countries such as Jamaica or British Guiana wished to secure its support in the struggle for achieving political independence, as they resolved problems of an anticolonial nature, Brazil (under the Quadros government) relied on its help in opposing the diktat of U. S. monopolies by broadening trade and economic relations with other developing countries.

Cuba as well relied on the support of the nonaligned countries in defending its revolutionary gains and systematically opposing imperialist maneuvers within the movement itself. In an effort to give nonalignment an active and aggressive nature, O. Dorticos, the head of the Cuban delegation at the second conference, held in Cairo in 1964, linked participation in the movement with the struggle for peace and socialism.

All of these tasks are of a single order and could only contribute to the unification of efforts. However, the existence of unifying objectives not only does not mean that ideological unity exists among the individual members of the movement but does not even determine identical interpretation of the basic concepts and principles of nonaffiliation. Furthermore, in the opinion of some Latin American supporters of nonalignment, no such unity is necessary. During the very first years of the movement's existence, it became apparent that there were differences in the interpretation of its nature, ways of future development and ideological-political orientation.

Although the Latin American participants in the nonalignment movement have been consciously smoothing over internal contradictions, the latter have steadily made themselves apparent in the 1970s as well.

According to some specialists, this was precisely the "Latin American" stage in the movement's development. The energizing of its supporters on the continent was determined by the overall upsurge in the anti-imperialist struggle, the successes achieved by revolutionary-democratic forces and the desire of a number of nationalistic and liberal-reformist regimes to pursue an independent course.

Peru, whose military-revolutionary government headed by J. Velasco Alvarado, constantly appealed for unity among developing countries, and believing that the "Peruvian process" was part of the common struggle for the liberation of

Third World nations, played a significant role in the movement in the first half of the 1970s. Mexico, whose president, L. Echeverria Alvarez, combined broadened contacts with Western European countries with a leading position in the movement, Bolivia, in the J. J. Torres government and Chile, under the Popular Unity government, showed a great interest in "aligning themselves with the nonaligned." Even Latin American countries whose governments did not unconditionally share the nonalignment principles and did not believe that their national tasks fully coincided with the interests of the entire community, participated in the movement one way or another, above all in the struggle for the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO).

In Latin America (in Peru, Mexico and Guyana in particular) the political rapprochement with the nonaligned countries of other continents was accompanied by the aspiration to engage in the theoretical development of the position of the nonaligned movement, which was most frequently identified with a kind of Third World political organization, and all of whose activities in this direction were considered mainly as a process of Third World self-assertion.³ Such an interpretation was characteristic of Mexico, Peru and the Peronista ideology in Argentina: nonalignment was considered equivalent to the development in the contemporary international situation of the old notorious "third position," the idea of which had been formulated by Peron as early as the 1940s and which had an entirely different content and a pro-European orientation at that time.

The gravitation of the Latin American supporters of nonaffiliation toward the Third World concept was related as a whole with the hope for possible radical changes in the system of international economic relations and, in some cases, the implementation of their national anti-imperialist and even noncapitalist programs.

Therefore, the first half of the 1970s was marked by the aspiration of a number of Latin American leaders to give a "tercermundistas" direction to the nonalignment movement, whose basic tasks and objectives were interpreted from the viewpoint of the theory of "poor" and "rich" nations and "two imperialisms." E. Mercado Jarrin, Peru's prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, one of the leaders and theoreticians of the movement, preached a policy of maneuvering between socialist and capitalist countries, calling for extracting maximum benefits from the contradictions between the superpowers.⁴ The thesis of the irreconcilable nature of contradictions between north and south was quite popular at that time in the Caribbean countries as well, which had recently become liberated from colonial dependence and which tended to reject the entire "European experience" as a whole as totally unacceptable to them.

Cuba, which favored a differentiated approach toward the developed countries and which tried to intensify the anti-imperialist nature of the concept and policy of nonalignment, opposed such trends which dominated Latin American nonalignment. Thus, when the question of the meaning of the movement and its "natural allies" was being debated at the third conference in Lusaka in 1970, and when many Latin American representatives were holding the position of

militant "tercermundismo," Raul Roa, the head of the Cuban delegation, defended the idea that the international policy and positions held by socialist and capitalist countries of equal economic development, giving in to the false slogan of "poor" and "rich" countries, should not be confused with each other. In all nonalignment meetings Cuba consistently supported the idea that it was precisely the socialist countries which were the main bulwark and most powerful force in the anti-imperialist struggle.

The influence of intensive Maoist propaganda and the attempts of the Beijing leadership to place the movement on the service of its own interests largely explained the trends toward the "tercermundistas" interpretation of the non-affiliation movement at the beginning of the 1970s. Although the very question of China's affiliation with the Third World and its involvement with the nonaffiliation movement was considered controversial by the nonalignment ideologues, its influence on some of its members was felt nevertheless.

In the period between the third and fourth conferences, the Latin American supporters of nonalignment (Peru, Mexico, Argentina and Guyana in particular) actively participated in the various commissions and organizations working on the establishment of the NIEO. The Lima declaration and the principles of the program of action (1971), as well as the so-called Charter of Economic Rights and Obligations of the States, formulated by Mexico in 1972, were of major importance in the theoretical elaboration of its basic concepts. The overall concept of the NIEO, which prevailed at that time, was largely based on the concept of "poor" and "rich" nations, which was expressed quite aggressively in the speeches of many participants in the fourth conference of nonaligned countries, which took place in Algiers in 1973. However, the interpretation of some aspects of the NIEO was far from unanimous. Thus, as interpreted by the representatives of Mexico and Peru--countries which aspired to becoming leaders of the movement--the NIEO represented a new system of international relations in the broadest possible interpretation of the term, a system which could become the only alternative to the threat of war created by the antagonism between the "superpowers."

A clear demarcation between supporters of the concept of "two imperialisms" and those who had adopted a realistic approach to the deployment of forces in the world and the development prospects of the movement itself, rejecting neutrality in matters such as war and peace and the struggle of nations for national liberation and social justice, was noted at that conference, which once again was held under the noticeable influence of Maoist concepts. Cuba, supported by the representatives of Jamaica, Guyana and Mexico, took a clear position. F. Castro, who was participating in the international nonalignment gathering for the first time, properly rebuffed those who pitted the interests of the developing against those of the socialist countries. He stated that "Any attempt to turn the nonaligned countries away from the socialist camp is profoundly counterrevolutionary and serves exclusively the expansionistic interests of imperialism." Cuba's principle-minded and uncompromising stand helped to strengthen its leading role in the movement.

Therefore, one of the most difficult and important problems, which determined the future of the nonalignment movement--the problem of its enemies and

allies--a permanent problem caused by the inner heterogeneity of the movement itself and the permanent struggle within it waged by forces of different social and political orientations, arose at the Algiers conference once again. And, as was the case with all the other encounters, once again the existence of common tasks and the need to resolve through joint efforts the common problem--development--prevailed over ideological contradictions and internal confrontations.

The next stage in the development of the Latin American nonalignment movement, a stage which can be obviously described as pragmatic, developed during the second half of the 1970s. This was clearly manifested at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of nonaligned countries, which was held in Lima in August 1975. As a whole, the efforts of the Latin American participants in the movement had lost their theoretical-political emphasis and the problem of the establishment of a new economic order without harming reciprocal national interests assumed priority.⁸ Many Latin American countries, particularly the economically most developed ones, which maintained close historical relations with Europe, were interested in their further development and diversification on a qualitatively new basis. By that time, most of them had realized that the Third World could not count exclusively on its own forces and possibilities, even if they were combined. However, the common development problems had remained relevant and their solution required some compromises with the "rich" countries.

The position of Peru and Mexico, which had been the leading forces in the preceding stage of Latin American nonalignment, changed. They became less active in "tercermundismo" as a result of changes in their domestic policies and their largely revised former nonalignment tactics and strategy. Although it proclaimed its support of the nonalignment principles, the new military government of Peru, headed by F. Morales Bermudez, was guided essentially by pragmatic interests in its relations with the other members of the movement, abandoning "tercermundismo" almost entirely.

The official Mexican leadership and the Argentine military cabinet proclaimed their affiliation mainly with the Western world, emphasizing that their only link with Third World countries was the struggle for the NIEO.

The changes in the nature of Latin American nonalignment were manifested particularly noticeably during the preparations for the fifth Colombo conference: the tenor of press reports changed and so did official estimates of the individual aspects of the movement. An ideological and political struggle on the question of the objectives and directions of the movement, which reflected the intensified polarization of the forces of progress and reaction and the aspiration of the most conservative and proimperialist circles to isolate Latin America from the common struggle waged by the peoples of the developing countries, developed in virtually all countries. Now most Latin American participants frankly gave priority to national tasks which they tried to resolve within the framework of the nonalignment movement. It was only the Caribbean countries, Jamaica and Guyana above all, which were still facing many problems of a colonial nature, which continued to consider the nonalignment movement as the main political organization of developing countries.

In Argentina the right-wing press sharply criticized the decision to send representatives to Colombo. However, the government which supported the already developed system of international interrelationships, substantiated Argentina's participation with the need to resolve the problem of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (the Malvinas) and the problem of hydraulic power resources used jointly with Brazil. Similar debates also took place in Brazil, where pro-Western feelings let themselves be known.

Also contradictory was Venezuela's attitude toward the forthcoming meeting: while favoring participation in all measures aimed at the establishment of the NIEO, Venezuela was unwilling to assume obligations toward economically weaker members of the movement, which its position as a petroleum-producing country imposed upon it. Thus, C. Andres Perez, the then Venezuelan president, repeatedly stated that he firmly opposed the strengthening of "poor" developing countries at the expense of other developing countries, although the latter may have reached a higher level of development. He constantly emphasized that giving aid to such countries¹⁰ was the duty above all and mainly of the industrially developed countries.

Cuba, supported by the Caribbean countries, Jamaica and Guyana in particular, firmly opposed the trend of reducing the political role of the movement and substituting narrow national pragmatism for its liberation and anti-imperialist nature. This was manifested during the conference of ministers of finance of the members of the Caribbean community, which took place in Georgetown in August 1975.¹¹

At the fifth conference, which was held in Colombo (August 1976), and which dealt mainly with the establishment of a NIEO and detente, the Latin American representatives, Mexico and Peru above all, actively supported the fastest possible reorganization of the entire system of existing international relations. However, diverging views were expressed on the subject of detente, for the various positions were based mainly on the viewpoint of cooperation with the socialist countries. The representatives of Peru, Colombia, Guyana and Jamaica (where Maoist influence was particularly strong at that time), continued to support the "superpower" concept, considering that the Soviet Union was as responsible as the United States for the failures of detente and claiming that the Third World would not benefit in the least from improved relations between the "superpowers" (a similar misinterpretation of the process of detente and the role which the USSR was playing in it was reflected in the concluding documents of the conference as well). At the same time, the criticism of U. S. imperialist expansion intensified noticeably and became sharper. The differentiated approach toward industrially developed countries became clearer: the socialist countries were no longer equated with the former colonial empires.¹²

Cuba, which remained loyal to its course of strengthening ties between non-aligned countries and the socialist comity, comprehensively contributed to the consolidation of this trend. Let us point out that Cuba's active anti-imperialist position was recognized and supported by a considerable number of participants in the conference, who rated its internationalist aid to the fraternal people of Angola positively.

The conference reasserted the existence of major objective contradictions within the Latin American nonalignment movement and the equally strong or even stronger desire for solidarity and unity of action for the sake of meeting common objectives. Although the program adopted at the conference raised the slogan "Collective reliance on one's own strength,"¹³ which was fully supported by the Latin American representatives, it was clear to many of them that their own strength was obviously insufficient and that one strategic compromise or another was necessary with the "rich" countries without, however, dropping the common major demand for change in international economic relations. For this reason the majority of participants in the Latin American nonalignment movement preferred not to emphasize ideological differences, giving priority mainly to unifying factors. For example, F. Burnham, the leader of the People's National Congress, the Guyanan ruling party, did not even raise the question of the need for ideological unity in the belief that total agreement can be achieved only on problems such as "economic nationalism" or "raw material prices."

Despite the permanent tendency shown by most participants in the Latin American nonalignment movement to smooth over existing contradictions, such contradictions reappeared during the preparations for the sixth conference, which was held in Havana in the summer of 1979, and which became particularly noticeable in the discussions of the problem on which the further development of the nonalignment movement depends greatly--its enemies and allies and relations with the socialist comity. The U. S. diplomats, who had increased meanwhile their pressure on the ministers of foreign affairs of nonaligned countries with a view to impressing their viewpoint on them regarding the nature, essence and tasks of the nonalignment movement, and to dictate to them a kind of program of action for the forthcoming conference, contributed substantially to the aggravation of the differences. Some of the Latin American and African participants in the movement were concerned by the active anti-imperialist position taken by F. Castro and his persistent efforts to give the nonaligned movement an effective liberation nature. They were displeased by the fact that the conference was to be held in Havana. Despite the strong pressure on the part of those who favored "neutrality" and "equal distance from the superpower blocs," at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of nonaligned countries, which was held in Belgrade in July 1978, the Cuban delegation had already sharply opposed attempts to give an anti-Soviet line to some formulations of the theoretical foundations of nonalignment and the tendency of the supporters of a compromise with imperialist forces to lead the movement astray from its main tasks and objectives, which had intensified in recent years.

The aggravation of contradictions within the movement was the reason for the tension which prevailed at the meeting held by the Coordination Bureau in Colombo, in June 1979, where the various viewpoints on the basic item to be discussed at the forthcoming conference clashed--the directions to be followed in the further development of the nonaligned movement and its ideological and political orientations.

The future meeting triggered rather conflicting attitudes in Latin America as well, where polarization among the supporters of nonalignment had become

noticeably intensified by the end of the 1970s. Many of the future participants in the conference declared their intention not only to try to resolve their most topical national problems during the conference but also "to restore the true nature of nonalignment," bearing in mind the so-called "equidistance." The positions of other countries were influenced by the specific features of their domestic and foreign political situation. For example, some Mexican circles, to whom opportunities for relations with the United States on a more reciprocally advantageous basis had opened as a result of the "petroleum boom," considered criticism of U. S. imperialism, which was included in the draft final declaration, somewhat excessive. In Argentina, the conservative press continued its campaign for withdrawing from the nonaligned movement. Thus, an editorial in LA NACION called for "if not properly breaking with the movement, at least avoiding the establishment of stronger ties with it."¹⁴ These forces were countered by political groups which were aware of the need to act jointly with other developing countries for the sake of the common objective--independent development. The government decided to send representatives to Havana, emphasizing that "participation of countries with different ideologies was a characteristic feature of the nonaligned movement," and gave priority to the problem of the Falkland Islands (the Malvinas). A similar situation developed in the summer of 1979 in Brazil, where the question of participation in the conference was discussed just as extensively.

The ruling circles of a number of Latin American countries adopted a critical attitude toward the draft final declaration and deliberately emphasized their pragmatic reasons for attending the conference. Therefore, at that stage as well the controversial nature of the Latin American nonaligned movement was manifested: while realizing and emphasizing their cultural and historical interconnection with the Western world, many Latin American countries, particularly the large ones, have been unwilling to adopt the nonaligned course in its entirety, although aware of the need for unity of action in the struggle for their rights and future development.

The forthcoming conference was unconditionally welcomed by a large number of countries, which considered it a new stage in the liberation from imperialism and neocolonialism. This applied above all to Panama, Peru, Bolivia, (under the L. Geyler government) and some members of the Caribbean community, where particularly extensive preparations for the conference took place. They tried to push into the background the existence of ideological contradictions in the movement and supported the idea of the need to preserve the "non-bloc character" of the nonaligned movement.¹⁵ (Let us point out that by the end of the 1970s voices which questioned the expediency of participation in the conference were heard in Peru as well. The fierce attacks which the supporters of Peru's capitalist modernization mounted against the very concept of non-alignment and the prejudiced criticism of the most progressive features of J. Velasco Alvarado's "tercermundistas" policy¹⁶ were closely tied to the turn to the right in the country's domestic policy and its intensifying foreign policy orientation toward the industrially developed capitalist countries.)

The different views on the further development of the nonaligned movement and its objectives, tasks and orientation were bound to appear at the sixth conference in Havana.¹⁷ Since problems directly related to Latin America were not treated as problems of prime importance at the conference, the position which one Latin American representative or another took on the tasks and directions of the movement and its opponents and allies was manifested indirectly in the interpretation of problems which had assumed priority in the ideological struggle within the movement, such as the Egyptian-Israeli agreement or the situation in Kampuchea. It was precisely these problems that became a testing stone in defining the attitude toward the idea defended by Cuba of the need to strengthen relations with the socialist countries and, on the other hand, the idea of the "preservation of the non-bloc nature of nonaffiliation," supported by some of the participants.

In addition to the constant contradictions existing between the Latin American countries leaning toward the socialist comity and the essentially more developed countries oriented toward Western Europe and interested in maintaining good neighborly relations with the United States, contradictions between the "poorer" Latin American countries, such as the members of the Caribbean commonwealth, and Venezuela, which did not like the idea that petroleum-extracting countries should invest some of their petrodollars in the implementation of joint development projects, became quite noticeable during the conference.

However, aware of the existence of centrifugal trends within the movement, the majority of its Latin American participants tried to prevent their development and were ready to counter the increased hostility and threats on the part of pro-imperialist Western European and U. S. circles with unity of forces and actions. At that stage as well the common task of opposing the expansion of U. S. imperialism became the basic unifying factor. In the final account, the line of the concluding declaration was determined by the thesis suggested and systematically defended by Cuba¹⁸--that U. S. imperialism was the main enemy of the developing countries.

The Havana meeting triggered a broad sociopolitical response in many Latin American countries (Mexico, Guyana, Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, Jamaica). Thus, in September 1979 the JAMAICA DAILY NEWS wrote that the sixth conference had clearly proved the existence of common positions existing between the non-alignment movement and the socialist comity, reemphasizing that "These two basic forces of our time are acting in a single direction." The fact that the conference was held precisely in Havana was considered a¹⁹ recognition of the growing influence of the nonalignment idea in the area.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the final declaration appeared to be a compromise between supporters of different viewpoints regarding the nature, direction and orientation of the movement, the internal confrontation in the Latin American sector of the movement was not reduced in the least. Thus, whereas the campaign of breaking with the movement under the slogan "Argentina Is Part of the West" continued in Argentina in 1980-1981, conversely, by virtue of an extreme aggravation of domestic and foreign economic problems in

Brazil at the beginning of the 1980s (caused among others by the need to import petroleum from other developing countries) a turn toward energizing relations²⁰ with other Third World countries, of which Brazil was now considered a part, and toward increased activities within the nonalignment movement was noted.

The nature of relations with the nonaligned movement noticeably changed in Peru after the advent of F. Belaunde Terry to power, and in Jamaica, after the victory of the Labor Party in the parliamentary elections at the end of 1980: cooperation with the developed Western countries and strengthening friendly relations with the United States were emphasized here.

It is possible to say that the contradictions within the Latin American non-alignment movement are increasing with the increased differences and even gaps in the levels of development of the individual countries and the increased tendency shown by the largest countries to strengthen their positions of leadership on their own continent and in the global community of developing countries.

After Cuba officially assumed the leadership of the nonalignment movement for the next 3 years in 1979, the center of attention of its Latin American sector shifted from strictly regional problems to the global problems of the anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggle. Believing that only the unity of action of the nonaligned countries and their cohesion could make the joint struggle for real political and economic independence truly effective, Cuba is trying above all to help in the elimination of conflicts and differences among the members of the movement. It was to this effect that I. Malmierca, Cuba's minister of foreign affairs, who has represented the country at many nonalignment meetings, went to Baghdad in April 1981 on a goodwill mission aimed at seeking possible ways to settle the Iran-Iraq conflict. Cuba holds a firm and uncompromising position as chairman of the movement on the question of Namibia, in assessing the situation in South Africa and in supporting the PLO,²¹ invariably supporting the idea of international solidarity and fraternal aid to peoples fighting for their liberation.

Cuba counters the efforts of the imperialist agents to split the movement and separate it from the socialist comity (during the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of nonaligned countries, which was held in Delhi on 9-13 February 1981, in connection with the discussion of the drastic worsening of the international situation, the so-called Afghan problem was raised through the efforts of pro-imperialist and pro-Beijing groups²²), with an effective anti-imperialism and friendship with the socialist countries, the Soviet Union above all, which has passed the test of time. Nicaragua as well (a full member of the movement since September 1979) is also helping to strengthen progressive trends within the nonalignment movement. From the very beginning, its leadership has linked participation in the nonalignment movement with²³ the struggle waged by the people of Nicaragua against U. S. imperialism.

It is quite symptomatic that democratic forces in El Salvador and Guatemala link the future of their countries with the nonaligned movement in terms of

the foreign policy aspects of their programs. In turn, they are supported by the movement. Finally, the crisis which broke out in the South Atlantic last April proved particularly clearly the objectively existing contradictions between developing countries as a whole and the Western imperialist countries. It also provided a convincing answer to the pro-Western critics of nonalignment in Argentina and other continental countries.

Therefore, during its 20-year period of existence, the Latin American non-alignment movement has crossed several stages based on the sociopolitical processes taking place on the continent, the development of the revolutionary and liberation struggle and the changes in the ratio of forces in the world arena. In this sector the movement developed in the course of a constant struggle among different ideological and political trends. However, at all stages the unifying factors proved to be stronger than centrifugal trends. The need not only to resolve most vital development problems jointly but, of late, to maintain unity of action under the circumstances of a developed offensive on the part of U. S. imperialism in Central America and the Caribbean Basin, in order to be able to defend their right to life and freedom and resist the encroachment on their legitimate rights on the part of Western imperialist circles (as the crisis in the South Atlantic proved) may reduce the importance of individual disagreements in terms of strictly national tasks within the Latin American nonalignment movement and become the basic and prime factor in its further consolidation.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. A. Tuzmukhamedov. "Nepri soyedineniye i Razryadka Mezhdunarodnoy Napryazhennosti" [Nonalignment and Detente]. Moscow, 1976, p 64.
2. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 4, 1979, pp 23-31.
3. G. Pope Atkins. "Latin America in the International Political System." New York-London, 1977, pp 378-380; EL SOL DE MEXICO. Mexico, 19 August 1976.
4. E. Mercado Jarrin. "El Peru y su politica exterior" [Peru and Its Foreign Policy]. Lima, 1971, pp 300, 303.
5. Sh. Sardesai. "Achievements and Difficulties of the Nonalignment Policy." PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 3, 1974, p 53.
6. NEWS FROM GUYANA, THE COOPERATIVE REPUBLIC, No 12, Georgetown, 1974, p 5.
7. F. Castro. "El exito y el porvenir del movimiento No Alineado estara en no dejarse penetrar, confundir ni enganar por la ideologia imperialista" [The Success and Future of the Nonaligned Movement Lie in Not Allowing Itself to be Penetrated, Confused or Tricked by Imperialist Ideology]. Havana, 1973, p 16.

8. LA PRENSA, 25 August 1975, Lima.
9. GUYNEWS, No 6, Georgetown, 1976, p 8.
10. See, for example: "Speech of the President of the Republic Carlos Andres Perez at the opening of the 17th World Management Congress, November 1975, S.l., s.a., pp 7-9.
11. GUYNEWS, Vol 6, No 1, Georgetown, 1975, p 8.
12. SIEMPRE, No 1208, Mexico, 1976, p 32.
13. MEZHDUNARODNAYA POLITIKA, No 634, Belgrade, 1977, p 37.
14. LA NACION, Buenos Aires, 28 May 1979.
15. EL COMERCIO, Lima, 1 September 1979; EXCELSIOR, Mexico, 9 September 1979.
16. G. Hoyos Osoreo. "Politica internacional del Peru, 7 anos de desvarios" [Peruvian International Policy, 7 Years of Extravagance]. Lima, 1977, pp 149-151.
17. The views held by the Latin American representatives on the various problems raised at the sixth conference have already been the subject of adequate interpretation. See Kh. Kobo, "The Forum of Nonaligned Countries (Results of the Havana Conference)." LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 1, 1980.
18. NUEVA SOCIEDAD, No 45, San Jose, 1979, pp 266, 270.
19. Ibid., No 44, pp 187, 196.
20. O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 20 March 1980.
21. GRANMA. Weekly summary, Havana, 21 February 1982.
22. Ibid., 10 February 1981.
23. EL DIA, Mexico, 7 September 1979; GRANMA, Weekly summary, 28 March 1982.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Latinskaya Amerika", 1982

5003

CSO: 1807/127

BOOK ON ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN STATES REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 82 pp 136-137

[Review by P. V. Griбанov of the book "Molodyye Gosudarstva Karibskogo Basseyna: Problemy Razvitiya" [The Young Countries in the Caribbean Basin: Development Problems]. A. S. Koval'skaya, responsible editor. USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Latin America, Moscow, 1981, 180 pages]

[Text] This new collection, written by a group of economists, historians and ethnographers from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Latin America, is a study of the English-speaking countries in the Caribbean Basin.

The first article, written by L. V. Skripnikova, deals with the history of the liberation struggle waged by the people of the British West Indies. The author analyzes the characteristics of the economic structure of the colonies created in Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. She describes the characteristics of the liberation struggle waged by their peoples and formulates their present tasks.

The article by I. A. Buyakova, which deals with the contemporary period starting with the 1970s, is a review of the basic features of the industrial structure of these countries, with particular emphasis on Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

The first of the two articles by A. S. Fetisov deals with the history of the organization of the current structure of agricultural production. It provides a sectorial characterization of agriculture and singles out the main contemporary types of farms. The second emphasizes the importance and "the significance of the development of transportation facilities in terms of intra-economic relations in these countries, bearing in mind that most of their domestic agricultural and industrial output is marketed abroad" (p 60). The article also contains a study of the condition and future of maritime, air and road transportation.

Yu. S. Stepanov discusses economic cooperation among the young countries. He points out that "As they develop, the integration processes in the Caribbean area are intensifying and turning into one of the important directions of the national liberation movement" (p 91). He also emphasizes that integration here "is currently in its initial stages and it would be an error to provide a simple assessment of these processes" (p 92).

The article by Ye. B. Anikina is an attempt to sum up the results of the sociopolitical development of English-speaking Caribbean countries at the beginning of the 1980s. The author traces the process of development of the proletariat and of the middle and marginal strata. She describes the basic political parties and the labor and trade union movements.

A. S. Koval'skaya discusses some aspects of the foreign policy of the young countries. She analyzes their relations with developed capitalist, developing and socialist countries and problems of cooperation with other countries in Latin America, as well as "internal" interrelationships in the area of the Caribbean Basin. The author points out that "The foreign policy activities of the young Caribbean countries is determined by two factors: on the one hand, dependence on imperialist centers and foreign monopolies; on the other, the desire to develop their economy and to strengthen their political independence and international prestige" (p 142).

The readers will be unquestionably interested in the article by A. D. Dridzo, which deals with cultural developments. For the first time in Soviet literature the author provides a detailed study of spoken folk art of the populations of the former British West Indies. He describes the West African cultural origins of the West Indian blacks (p 144), characterizes the Creole dialects, considers in detail the various genres of Jamaican folklore and Trinidad calypso; he analyzes the history and current state of fiction in Guyana, Jamaica and other countries and describes the theater and cinematography of the young countries. The author emphasizes that "Characteristic of the contemporary independent West Indian countries is a situation in which the role of folklore remains quite significant in national culture. Coexisting with professional literature and art, folklore has proved to be strikingly viable" (p 175).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Latinskaya Amerika", 1982

5003

CSO: 1807/127

END